THE “WAR ON TERROR” DELIVERANCES Recognising that the war in Iraq took place without the authority of the United Nations, that weapons of mass destruction have never been found in Iraq and that thousands of innocent people have lost their lives as a result of the war, call for a full public inquiry into the decision of the United Kingdom government to join with the United States of America in launching an attack on Iraq. Strongly condemn acts of terrorism in all their forms and call on church members to pray for all who suffer as a result of terrorist atrocities. Stand in solidarity with our sister churches in the United States of America, recognising their strongly advocated alternative vision for American policy to that being enacted by the Bush Administration, and encourage their continued advocacy of this vision. Call on HMG to support the upgrading of the rôle of the United Nations in its involvement in the shaping of the new Iraqi state and in the reconstruction of Iraq. Commend HMG for pursuing a constructive diplomatic policy in regard to Iran, Syria and Libya. Call on HMG to ensure that changes to anti-terrorist legislation comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. Condemn the holding of prisoners without trial at Belmarsh Prison and strongly urge HMG to increase diplomatic efforts to have the remaining UK prisoners freed from detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. View with abhorrence any incident of the ill treatment of prisoners in Iraq by any member of the coalition forces and call for the observance of the Geneva Convention and protocols in respect of all prisoners of war. Recognise the professionalism and bravery of British troops in their difficult rôle as part of an occupying power and the significant support given to them by their chaplains. Acknowledge those British servicemen and women who have lost their lives during the “war on terror” and extend sympathy to the families and friends left behind. Also express gratitude and prayerful support to chaplains and agencies, Christian and otherwise, who have helped those who are grieving to come to terms with their loss. THE “WAR ON TERROR” 1. Introduction Last year the Committee submitted a Supplementary Report to the General Assembly on the war in Iraq. This was issued within weeks of the war ending and at a time when it was still unclear precisely how the situation in Iraq would develop. As well as seeking to inform the General Assembly about events in Iraq over the past year, this present report encompasses the consequences of what has come to be known as the “war on terror”. It cannot cover the full depth and breadth of this debate, but instead seeks to offer an overview to help the Church understand one of the most critical issues facing the world at this time. 2. Waging War 2.1 The term “waging war” is often applied rhetorically to crime, poverty, drugs and other social problems. Dictionaries define war as “armed fighting between two or more countries or groups”. However, they also state that a war can be “any situation in which there is fierce competition between opposing sides or a great fight against something harmful.” Since 11 September 2001, the United States of America (USA) has taken the latter definition and applied it to international terrorism. Such an understanding has no basis in international law, which in general defines war as a “sustained struggle of a scale and duration that threatens the existence of the government of a state and that is waged between groups of forces that are armed, wear a distinctive insignia, and are subject to military discipline under a responsible command.”i Despite this, in his State of the Union address in 2004, President George Bush said: “I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all. They view terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement and indictments. After the World Trade Center was first attacked in 1993, some of the guilty were indicted, tried, convicted, and sent to prison. But the matter was not settled. The terrorists were still training and plotting in other nations, and drawing up more ambitious plans. After the chaos and carnage of September 11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States and war is what they got.” 2.2 The enemy with which the USA seeks to engage is a shadowy force, not a government; its methods are unpredictable and there is little prospect of coming to a negotiated peace settlement as in the aftermath of a conventional war. In their speeches, politicians speak about defeating terrorism and winning the war. This is similar to declaring that crime will be defeated, or that evil can be completely overcome in the world. According to Professor Michael Clarke, Director of the Policy Institute at King’s College, London: “There is no magic formula for dealing with terrorism: no one battle that wins the war, no technique that destroys the evil of it. Politicians simply have to keep their nerve, their sense of proportion, and do more of the same with greater efficiency and determination.”ii 2.3 This understanding of the word “war” in response to the threat of terrorism has been a major error of judgement by the Western powers. It creates the impression that this is a war which can be won through military campaigns such as that in Iraq, an impression which is wholly misleading. It simply plays into the hands of the terrorists, who are happy to be at war and pleased to have their campaign raised to such a status. It also allows governments to introduce laws which infringe the legal rights of its citizens because extreme measures can be taken in a “war” situation. It is naïve to believe that terrorism can be overcome simply by removing regimes considered to be dangerous, as the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan has shown. As we have argued in past reports, combating terrorism has to be a process which runs much deeper and involves tackling the root causes. This has been recognised by the senior intelligence officer in the USA, George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who said in a speech in December 2002: “We cannot win the war on terror simply by defeating and dismantling al-Qaeda. To claim victory, we and our allies will need to address the circumstances that bring peoples to despair, weaken governments, and create power vacuums that extremists are all too ready to fill”.iii 2.4 The suffering inflicted by terrorists on innocent people in many nations throughout the world has been considerable. Since 11 September 2001, hundreds of people have been murdered by ruthless, evil fanatics who seek to kill and maim as many people as they possibly can. However, the cost of the response to these actions – the “war on terror” – has also been considerable and many more people have died as a result of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq than have been killed by terrorists since 11 September 2001. 2.5 The number of civilian deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq is extremely difficult to quantify. The USA refuses to give any estimates of civilian casualties, as well as seeking to prevent media coverage of the return of the bodies of USA soldiers and the huge casualty rate among the USA army. According to the Project on Defence Alternatives, anywhere from 8,700 – 11,500 were killed in the two wars. However, although President Bush declared “mission accomplished” on Iraq, the death toll has continued to rise. According to the Iraq Body Count group, made up of USA and United Kingdom researchers, as many as 10,000 non-combatant civilian deaths during 2003 have been reliably reported so far. 2.6 The killing of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the leader of the terrorist organisation Hamas, by Israel in March 2004 is a prime example of another state taking the rhetoric of the war on terrorism and using it to justify its actions. 3. Afghanistan 3.1 In 2002 the General Assembly regretted the use of military force by the USA in Afghanistan, in the light of the loss of life of so many civilians. The committee continues to believe that responding to the 11 September attacks with the use of force cannot defeat terrorism and that the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan outwith Kabul confirms this. Such a military response simply perpetuates more violence and fails to address the underlying causes of international terrorism. 3.2 We recognise that the Taliban regime was one of the most brutal and repressive in the world and severely curtailed human rights. We also accept that since the overthrow of the Taliban at the end of 2001, there have been some positive developments in Afghanistan. However, the achievements have to be weighed against the severe difficulties which Afghanistan is now facing. In recent months there has been an increase in terrorist activity, factional fighting, activities associated with the illegal drugs trade and unchecked criminality. 3.3 There are currently four military forces in Afghanistan, all of which contribute to providing security. These are: * The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This is a multi-national UN-mandated security force that only operates in Kabul. It is 5,200 strong and is under the command of NATO. * The USA-led coalition forces. These consist of (predominantly) USA troops who are continuing to prosecute the war against al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants in the south and east of Afghanistan. The force is approximately 9,000 strong and is controlled by USA central command. * The Afghan National Army. This army is currently made up of approximately 5,000 troops but it is widely agreed that the Afghan National Army needs to comprise a force of some 70,000 troops for it to be effective. It is controlled by the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA). * Local militia groups maintained by regional power holders. Different power holders control different-size militia groups, estimated to range from 5,000 militias to 50,000. These groups are loyal to regional power holders, not to the Afghan government. 3.4 The most favoured means of improving national security is to allow ISAF troops to move beyond Kabul, even if such an expansion is limited to key urban centres and mobile units secure transport networks. The UN Secretary General, the ATA, MPs, MEPs, USA Senators and Non-Governmental Organisations have called for an expansion of the ISAF mandate. In military terms, the Taliban do not present a significant threat to the American troops based in and around Kabul. There is little possibility of them re-establishing themselves as the rulers of any significant part of Afghanistan in the near future. The Taliban could continue to make Afghanistan difficult to govern and could be serious wreckers of the process to build an Afghan democracy. 3.5 Much of the country beyond Kabul is governed by local warlords and factional fighting between them is common. This lack of access to assistance or structures of the State risks further alienating the population in these regions and may increase their willingness to tolerate or support the presence of groups among them who oppose the government. Although the government of President Hamid Karzai is struggling to expand its rule throughout the country, it is poorly funded and insufficiently equipped. In the first two years, the USA spent $11 billion a year on its military forces in Afghanistan and only $900 million on reconstruction aid. A Rand Corporation study of recent nation-building efforts revealed that the deployment of international peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo is one hundred times greater than in Afghanistan. Per capita foreign aid for the first two years of conflict in Bosnia was $1,390 and in Kosovo $814, while in Afghanistan, it is $52. 3.6 There is also the need for greater international investment in Afghanistan. In January 2002 the international community pledged US $4.5 billion to meet reconstruction costs, to be disbursed over the following five years. At the third international conference on Afghanistan in Berlin at the end of March 2004, Afghanistan sought $27.5 billion in aid to support reconstruction over the next seven years. At the time of writing, the office of President Karzai has received less than $1billion for reconstruction. 3.7 In addition to the resurgence of the Taliban, Afghanistan has resumed harvesting massive amounts of opium and now accounts for 77% of global opium production according to the latest annual report of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Twenty-eight out of thirty-two provinces in Afghanistan now produce the drug crop, up from eighteen provinces in 1999. Cultivation has spread outside the traditional eastern and southern producing areas. The 3,600 tons of opium produced in Afghanistan last year was processed into 360 tons of heroin. The total revenues of poppy farmers and traffickers amounted to more than half of Afghanistan's gross domestic product of $4.4 billion. Drug money now finances local warlords and terrorists, possibly including the resurgent Taliban. 3.8 At the time of the fall of the Taliban, many welcomed what was expected to be the restoration of human rights. Women in particular were viewed as having been freed from appalling repression. While their situation has improved, this is limited again to Kabul and beyond here many women are subject to physical and sexual abuse, are unable to travel without permission from the war lords and are still forced to wear certain clothes and prevented from participating in public life. According to the most recent United Nations report on Afghanistan, there is, “…intimidation against independent media and political groups; human rights violations committed by local government officials, particularly police, including arbitrary arrests, intimidation, torture and extrajudicial killings; abuses committed by local commanders and armed groups, such as extortion, intimidation, rape, murder, illegal detention and forced displacement; abuses against women and children, including trafficking, sexual violence and forced marriage; and property seizure and forced displacement, particularly by government officials using the cover of law for personal gain. Abuses committed by local commanders and armed groups remain of serious concern. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned efforts to expand its authority, the Government remains, in too many cases, unable to address arbitrary rule by too many of its own agents”.iv 3.9 Under the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, the ATA was due to oversee the drafting of a constitution and holding of “free and fair” elections across the country no later than June 2004. However, President Karzai has delayed the elections until September after UN and USA officials said attacks by Taliban fighters, the activities of warlords and slow voter registration are harming the election process. 3.10 We agree with a Christian Aid report of September 2003, which stated: “Effective security remains the core building block without which both the reconstruction and the political transformation of Afghanistan cannot take place. Without freedom of movement, accessibility and an independent assessment of the needs of the population, the reconstruction process cannot begin in earnest, never mind be successfully completed. Without freedom of thought, expression and information; education and awareness-raising to inform political choices; and the movement to create viable national institutions, the political transformation of Afghanistan cannot occur.”v 3.11 Tony Blair promised the Afghan people in a speech to the Labour Party Conference of 2001 that “we will not walk away, as the outside world has done so many times before”. He followed this up with an interview with the BBC World Service in which he stated: “At the end of the 80s and early 90s we, in a sense, walked away from the people of Afghanistan after the Russians had left. We really should, at that point in time, have put together a proper rescue plan for the people of Afghanistan - but we didn't. We are now making this commitment to them that this conflict will not be the end. We will do everything we can during the conflict to minimise the suffering of people. But once the conflict is over, we have then got to sit down with the people in Afghanistan and try and work out a stable and coherent plan for the future."vi The West may not have “walked away”, but the implementation of the “stable and coherent plan for the future” has been far from impressive and the outlook for the people of Afghanistan continues to be bleak. 4. Guantanamo Bay 4.1 The USA claims that the magnitude of the attacks of 11 September 2001 on its soil justifies its claim to be at war. These attacks were horrific and their scale was shocking. However, they were not carried out by a state with a recognised government. To see them as a declaration of war would mean that the same should be applied to terrorist acts prior to 11 September, which may not have been on the same scale, but still caused considerable loss of life. For example, most of those murdered over Lockerbie in 1988 were USA citizens, but the USA did not declare war on Libya. 4.2 By claiming that it is at war with al Qaeda, the Bush administration has been able to apply the rules which normally cover a conventional war between states or an armed uprising against a government. In fact, through its treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, it has gone beyond the boundaries set by the Geneva Convention. Article 118 of the Geneva Convention states that “Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities”. We deplore the fact that the Bush Administration has simply ignored this by claiming that its prisoners are enemy combatants and are not therefore subject to the terms of the Geneva Convention. It has therefore been able to ignore the rule under the Convention that “no prisoner of war may be convicted without having had an opportunity to present his defence and the assistance of a qualified advocate or counsel”.vii 4.3 There have been many allegations of torture at Guantanamo Bay, strongly denied by the USA authorities. Detailed accounts of the harsh treatment meted out to prisoners have been given by those released. If these allegations are true, then the Geneva Convention has been broken again, as Article 99 states that “no moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the act of which he is accused”. 4.4 Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch points out that: “Washington must also remember that its conduct sets an example for governments around the world. After all, many other states would be all too eager to find an excuse to eliminate their enemies through war rules. Israel, to name one, has used this rationale to justify its assassination of terrorist suspects in Gaza and the West Bank. It is not hard to imagine Russia doing the same to Chechen leaders in Europe, Turkey using a similar pretext against Kurds in Iraq, China against Uighurs in Central Asia, or Egypt against Islamists at home.”viii 4.5 The treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay casts a stain on a nation which was founded on principles of justice, freedom and equality for all under the law. The prisoners should be given full legal rights and access to lawyers, followed by trials which conform to the normal rules of USA law. They can then be convicted or set free. We agree with the analysis made by the former hostage, Terry Waite, who said that there was a moral equivalence between his imprisonment by terrorists in Lebanon and what is happening today at Guantanamo Bay. 5. Iraq 5.1 Present Situation 5.1.1It is now almost a year since the war in Iraq was declared over, although fighting has continued and there have been many attacks on civilians, the occupying forces and the Iraqi police force. The task of reconstructing Iraq has been severely curtailed by the lack of proper planning by the occupying powers and the extremely unstable security situation. 5.1.2 Iraq has a population of 24 million, of which 60% is Shiite, 18% Sunni Kurd, and 15% Sunni Arab. It was a Sunni Arab clique led by Saddam Hussein which ruled the country until the end of the last Iraq war. The country is now being governed temporarily by the “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA) led by the USA and the UK. On 6 May, 2003, President Bush named Ambassador Paul Bremer as presidential envoy to, and senior CPA official in, Iraq. In addition to the CPA, there is a twenty-five member “Governing Council” made up of leading Iraqis, which met for the first time on 13 July, 2003. 5.1.3 The Coalition Governing Council will transfer sovereignty to a fully sovereign Iraqi Interim Government on the 30 June 2004. The Iraqi Governing Council will also cease to exist at that date. The Interim Government will hold power until: * A 275 member National Assembly is elected no later than 31 January 2005. * Governate Councils are elected for each of the eighteen current Governates by the same date. (The Kurdish Regional Government will continue in its present form). 5.1.4 After the election of a National Assembly, it will: * Write a draft constitution by 15 August 2005 and shall present it for approval in a referendum by 15 October 2005. * On the assumption that the constitution is approved, organise elections for a permanent government, to be held no later than 15 December 2005 with the Government taking office by 31 December 2005. The Transitional Administrative Law passed by the Iraqi Governing Council on the 8 March 2004 states: “This Government (the transitional Government) shall be constituted in accordance with a process of extensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conducted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and possibly with the United Nations.” 5.1.5 The form of the Interim Government replacing the Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council has not yet been determined following the rejection of proposals from the Provisional Authority and the confirmation by a UN team that free and fair elections could not be held by the 30 June. The present assumption is that the Iraqi Governing Council will continue in existence, possibly in an enlarged form, until the elections for the National Assembly in December 2004. If this happens the Coalition will have to choose a Prime Minister, before 30 June, for the interim period until the National Assembly elections. 5.2 The Role of the United Nations 5.2.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1511 of 16 October 2003, recognised the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council and called on them to “…return governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of Iraq as soon as practicable.” That Resolution also requested the Secretary General of the UN to ensure that the resources of the UN were available to assist in the drafting of a new constitution and in the holding of elections in Iraq, if these were requested by the Iraqi Governing Council. Following from this Resolution the Secretary General started to build up an Assistance Mission (UNAMI) for Iraq. Because security could not be assured in Iraq the Mission is based in Nicosia and Amman. The staff of about sixty includes public information, human rights and development programme officers and support staff. This is in addition to the activities of the UN in relief and development work. 5.2.2 At the request of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Iraqi Governing Council and “other Iraqi organisations and personalities”, the Secretary General sent a fact-finding mission to Iraq. The report concluded that credible elections could not be held in Iraq by 30 June 2004, but they could be organised by the end of 2004 or a little later if decisions on the format of the elections could be agreed by the end of May. It also noted the rejection by Iraqi opinion of the system of caucuses proposed by the Coalition Governing Council. 5.2.3 On 18 March 2004 the Secretary General’s Special Advisor, Lakdar Brahimi, gave a press briefing stating the UN’s willingness to participate in finding a consensus amongst Iraqis leading to an interim Government and to assist in the preparations for elections to be held at the end of 2004. The statement made clear that the UN would not be able to assist without a clear request from the Iraqi Governing Council. Following letters from the Provisional Authority and the Governing Council, the Security Council agreed on 24 March to send a UN mission to Iraq to help form an interim Government and to assist with the preparations for elections. The team will be led by Lakdar Brahimi. 5.3 Rebuilding the Economy 5.3.1 The Iraqi economy remains extremely fragile. The unemployment rate remains high (perhaps 28%-50%) and high inflation is a new and increasing concern. In May 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1483, lifting sanctions on Iraq, phasing out the six year-old UN "Oil-for-Food" programme over six months (it ended on 21 November, 2003), and designating a UN "special representative" to assist Iraq in its reconstruction efforts. On 11 December 2003 the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the World Bank launched the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, a mechanism which will allow governments to contribute to the rebuilding of Iraq's economy and infrastructure through projects administered by UN agencies and the World Bank. 5.3.2 Monthly wages for many Iraqi workers have risen and there is evidence of buying patterns that warn of capacity strains to come. For example, white goods have been sold in large quantities in shops and markets in Basra. This is likely to strain the electricity system to the point where the widespread blackouts of last summer could re-emerge, despite a large part of a $127m emergency infrastructure fund being dedicated to reinforcing the transmission network since then. The CPA is planning to have raised generation capacity across the country by 50% by the peak summer period. Car ownership has increased rapidly as vehicles, mostly second-hand, arrived in the country. In November 2003, 7,000 new cars were registered and queues of over a mile have formed outside Basra's eight petrol stations, where pumps often break down and where further reconstruction efforts are being focused. 5.3.3 Estimates of the reconstruction costs for rebuilding Iraq range widely, from $50 billion to $100 billion over the next 10 years. 5.4 Debt Relief 5.4.1 Since 1990 Iraq has suffered a catastrophic decline in living standards and an associated increase in poverty. Human-development indicators for health, education, and nutrition have worsened dramatically. The effects of sanctions and the two Gulf wars have had devastating effects on the Iraqi people, its economy and infrastructure. Of the many problems confronting attempts at social and economic recovery in Iraq, one crucial area is foreign debt. After years of misrule, war, and deteriorating living conditions, Iraq’s people are among the most indebted in the world. Each of the country’s citizens owes its creditors around $11,000, as much as fifty-five times the annual income of Iraq’s most impoverished people. Saddam Hussein’s regime was responsible for the borrowing that created the debt, but this was matched by irresponsible lending on the part of commercial creditors, western governments and a number of Gulf States. 5.4.2 Iraq’s debt is not re-payable. Repayment would require the transfer of all of Iraq’s oil revenue for twenty years. Even if the repayments were rescheduled, creditors’ demands would divert resources from vital investments in social and economic infrastructure. The case for debt relief is reinforced by the fact that much of Iraq’s debt is illegitimate in a wider sense. The doctrine of “odious debt” clearly sets out the reasons for this illegitimacy. Debt is considered odious if borrowing was undertaken by a regime which had no popular mandate; if debt money was not used to the benefit of the population; and if creditors acted in the knowledge that lending was being used to finance activities – such as gross corruption, invasion, human-rights violations, or genocide – damaging to human welfare. 5.4.3 According to a report by Oxfam, “Some of the governments most loath to discuss debt relief – including those of France, Germany, Russia, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia – lent irresponsibly to and effectively buttressed Saddam Hussein’s regime. And there is clear evidence that some governments – including those of the USA and Britain – encouraged commercial links with Saddam, despite clear evidence that debt was being used to finance the violation of human rights, military adventures, and the development of chemical weapons.”ix 5.4.4 Estimates of the level of Iraq’s foreign debt vary, but it is believed to be in the region of $120 billion. The USA has indicated that lenders should forgive about two-thirds of the debt. Japan's government, for example, is reported to be considering forgiving at least $3 billion of the $7 billion owed to it by Iraq. We fully endorse the cancellation of Iraq’s debt, but it is important that any debt-reduction programme is financed from additional resources, rather than by a diversion of funds from Africa and other developing regions. The understanding among many foreign creditors for the need to write off Iraq’s debt contrasts with their unwillingness to do so in developing nations where such a policy is not so politically expedient. 5.5 Human Rights 5.5.1 The Bush administration’s campaign to assemble domestic and international political support in the build up to the war sometimes invoked the appalling human rights record of Saddam Hussein’s government, though few believed this was a significant motivating factor behind the decision to go to war. As its claims of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) lost credibility, the USA administration and the UK government more insistently cited human rights crimes to give the war retrospective justification. 5.5.2 In the military occupation of Iraq and counterinsurgency operations, however, the USA and its allies have demonstrated ambivalence toward human rights and humanitarian law concerns. They have too often set aside lessons from past international interventions that demonstrate the importance of rights monitoring and protection. Examples of this include the failure to deploy sufficiently trained and equipped forces for law enforcement responsibilities; the failure initially to protect mass grave sites or to ensure that professional forensic exhumations were conducted to preserve evidence of past atrocities; and the resistance of the USA to any international rôle in efforts to address responsibility for serious past crimes in Iraq. 5.5.3 More than 8,000 detainees, including women and teenagers, are held without charge or trial and without access to lawyers and sometimes even relatives. These detainees have been arrested in clashes with Coalition forces, during house searches, on suspicion of belonging to the Ba'ath Party or previous security force agencies, for being a relative of a former official or because of alleged involvement as scientists in Iraq's weapons programme. 5.5.4 In November 2003 the USA military said it had paid out $1.5 million to Iraqi civilians to settle claims by victims or relatives of victims for personal injury, death or damage to property. Some of the 10,402 claims reportedly filed concerned incidents in which USA soldiers had shot dead or seriously wounded Iraqi civilians with no apparent cause. Beyond such payments, however, there has been little recourse for the families of the dead and injured and no USA soldier has been prosecuted for illegally killing an Iraqi civilian. Iraqi courts, because of an order issued by the CPA in June 2003, are forbidden from hearing cases against USA soldiers or any other foreign troops or foreign officials in Iraq. 5.5.5 An unknown number of detainees have died in detention. Amnesty International has documented allegations of physical and psychological torture or ill-treatment of detainees by Coalition forces. No thorough and independent investigations are known to have been carried out into any of these allegations. 5.5.6 On several occasions, Iraqi civilians have been shot dead when lethal force should have been avoided. Houses and plantations have been deliberately destroyed, apparently as a form of collective punishment in retaliation for attacks by armed groups against Coalition forces. According to Human Rights Watch, the Coalition Authority should fully investigate all cases where there are credible allegations or other reasons to suspect that use of lethal force by occupation troops may have led to wrongful death or injury to Iraqi civilians. There is also the need to establish an independent central depository to receive forensic evidence from mass graves as well as documentary evidence and eyewitness testimonies related to serious past human rights abuses. The establishment of a special criminal tribunal for past crimes, that incorporates experienced international as well as Iraqi judges and prosecutors in all key departments, would be a further important step forward. 5.6 Security 5.6.1 Iraqis face threats to their lives and security every day. Violence is endemic, whether in the form of attacks by armed groups or criminal gangs, or abuses by the occupying forces. Since May 2003 there has been an increase in the incidence of targeted and indiscriminate attacks carried out by armed groups opposed to the occupation. These groups continue to carry out indiscriminate bomb attacks killing mostly civilians, Iraqi police and aid workers, including staff of international humanitarian organizations. It is ironic that while Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden were never allies before the war, it is likely that forces supportive of al-Qaeda are currently fighting side by side with the remnants of the Ba’athist regime. 5.6.2 In Southern Iraq, for example, Christians, Sabeans and some Sunni Muslims have been the target of such attacks. Former members of the Ba'ath Party, police and security officials are equally targeted in "revenge" killings. In other areas, those seen as collaborating with the occupying forces, as well as politicians and religious leaders, increasingly fall victim to such attacks. Unexploded bomblets from cluster bombs have also led to the deaths of many people. 5.6.3 Violence against women and girls has sharply increased in Iraq and many armed groups have issued threats against women not observing the Islamic dress code or against women human rights activists. In Basra, women and girls not wearing the hijab have been threatened and now almost all cover themselves. Many women and girls live under constant fear of being harassed, beaten, abducted, raped or murdered. 5.6.4 The problems stem partly from the lack of preparation undertaken by the USA and the UK for the kind of civil unrest and attacks on the military which quickly escalated once the war was declared over. The decision by the USA to disband the Iraqi army was a catalyst for opposition. The decision put about 500,000 people out of work and some of them make up a dissatisfied, armed and dangerous group. 5.6.5 One of the main responses to the insurgency in Iraq has been for the USA forces to put considerable emphasis on building up Iraqi police and security forces. In practice, though, the level of attacks on these forces has been so intense that it is now accepted that USA troops will stay as occupying forces for a long time to come. 5.6.6 At the end of the first phase of the war, last April, it was expected that USA force levels in Iraq would decline to about 70,000 by last September with further decreases in the following months as the troops were concentrated in the four permanent bases then envisaged. However, at the time of writing there are still 130,000 troops present. In the next few months those will be replaced by slightly smaller forces, but the Pentagon is now planning for the probability of retaining around 100,000 troops in Iraq for at least two years, as well as substantial numbers in Kuwait, one of the reasons why the USA Army is increasing its overall troop strength by 30,000. 5.6.7 Under international humanitarian law, the coalition forces, as occupying powers, have a responsibility to guarantee the safety of the civilian population in Iraq. They have an obligation to maintain and restore public order and to provide food, medical care and relief assistance. The task of bringing this about still has a very long way to go. 5.7 Weapons of Mass Destruction 5.7.1 A number of claims were made about the state of Iraq’s WMD programme in order to justify going to war. These were contained in the UK’s September 2002 dossier and in statements from the Bush administration, particularly a presentation made to the UN Security Council by Secretary of State, Colin Powell. 5.7.2 After almost a year of searching, no WMDs have been found, although the USA and UK governments argue that weapons programmes have been discovered and that Saddam Hussein still had the potential to develop them. They also point out that Iraq is a large country (the same size as France) and that the work of searching goes on. However, the statement by the former Head of the Iraq Survey Group, David Kay, that there are no WMDs in Iraq proved very difficult for the USA and the UK. 5.7.3 In looking at examples of claims made prior to the war, the suggestion that Iraq had sought uranium from Niger, in West Africa proved to be based on forged documents. The claim that thousands of aluminium tubes imported by Iraq could be used in centrifuges to create enriched uranium was rejected by the International Atomic Energy Agency as well as by American nuclear scientists. The claim that Iraq had up to twenty long-range Scud missiles, prohibited under UN sanctions, was never backed up. Finally, the central claim that Iraq had massive stockpiles of chemical and biological agents, including nerve gas, anthrax and botulinum toxin, has not been shown to be true despite searches at hundreds of sites targeted. 5.7.4 Saddam Hussein did once possess WMDs and was prepared to use them against the Kurds. However, it is clear that these were either dismantled through the UN weapons inspections in the late 1990’s, or destroyed by Iraq voluntarily. Iraq clearly did not possess a major threat to other nations and the intelligence on this was simply wrong. Since this was the sole reason given by the UK government for going to war, we believe that it should admit that there are no weapons and that it was wrong to launch the war on this basis. 6. The Use of Intelligence 6.1 There has been considerable controversy in the USA and UK about the use of intelligence in the build up to the war in Iraq. This is a highly complex issue and we do not intend in this report to detail the many aspects about intelligence which emerged from the Hutton inquiry into the death of the government scientist, Dr. David Kelly. Instead, we simply highlight the question of whether intelligence was manipulated and exaggerated in order to justify going to war against Iraq. 6.2 The key issue, which has never been fully addressed, is whether the House of Commons and the British people were misled by the government over the reasons for going to war with Iraq. The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has made it clear that regime change was not a reason for the UK going to war. The justification given was the threat from Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction. This threat was so great that it was claimed in the dossier released by the government that Saddam Hussein could launch chemical and biological weapons in forty-five minutes. Tony Blair later admitted that he was not aware that the forty-five minute claim related only to short range battlefield weapons. The dossier was severely criticised for recycling old material, accepting the word of unreliable informers and making claims not based on any clear evidence. 6.3 One argument which has been put forward is that Tony Blair genuinely believed that weapons of mass destruction existed in Iraq and posed a serious threat, based on the intelligence he received. It may be that the intelligence services provided him with inaccurate information, but this was not his responsibility. The counter argument is that the government took the intelligence which existed on Iraq and exaggerated it in order to justify its position that Iraq posed a serious threat. While Lord Hutton decided that this was not the case, (finding that John Scarlet, head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, had only done so subconsciously) the evidence presented to the Hutton Inquiry (a large proportion of which Lord Hutton did not refer to in his report) was felt by many commentators, politicians and lawyers to point to the limited accurate intelligence available being manipulated to make the case for war. 6.4 A Commission of Inquiry has been appointed by George Bush in the USA. Its remit is to compare intelligence about Iraq with what has been found on the ground there, to review intelligence on countries the USA deems to be threats, such as Iran and North Korea, to take advantage of unrestricted access to intelligence agencies and to the work of the Iraq Survey Group and to make recommendations to ensure that intelligence is as accurate as possible in the future. Colin Powell has now admitted that portions of his presentation to the UN prior to the war were erroneous. The report should be submitted by 31 March, 2005. 6.5 One result of the announcement of this USA inquiry was the setting up of the Butler inquiry in the UK. Its remit is to investigate coverage available on WMD programmes of countries of concern and on the global trade in WMD, taking into account what is now known about these programmes. As part of this work, it is to investigate the accuracy of intelligence on Iraqi WMD up to March 2003, and to examine any discrepancies between the intelligence gathered, evaluated and used by the government before the conflict, and between that intelligence and what has been discovered by the Iraq Survey Group since the end of the conflict. It has also been asked to make recommendations to the Prime Minister on the future gathering, evaluation and use of intelligence on WMD, in the light of the difficulties of operating in countries of concern. The Inquiry was originally intended to be cross-party in nature. However, the Liberal Democrats refused to co-operate from the beginning and the Conservative Party withdrew its support later. Lord Butler has indicated that it will deal primarily with processes and not the rôle of politicians, a decision which has been strongly criticised. 6.6 The Hutton Inquiry failed to address the many serious questions which have been raised by the use of intelligence in the run up to war, partly because of the narrow remit given to Lord Hutton in the first place. It is to be hoped that the Butler Inquiry might fully address these issues, but its remit is still not broad enough to do so effectively. We therefore believe that the only realistic option is for a full public inquiry to be held not only into the rôle of the intelligence services, but also into the whole question of why this country went to war against Iraq and how it can be justified in relation to international law. 7. Libya 7.1 In marked contrast to the policy pursued by the USA and the UK on Iraq, the policy on Libya has been one of quiet diplomacy, which has led to some positive results. The dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons programme marks the first time in almost thirty years that any nation has ended such a programme without a change in regime. 7.2 On 19 December 2003, Libya announced it would halt its non-conventional weapons programs and eliminate any stockpiles of weapons under international verification and supervision. It joined the Chemical Weapons Convention on 6 January, 2004. By 19 January, it had also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Libya's decision was the culmination of nine months of secret negotiations between Libyan, USA, and British officials. In March 2003, Musa Kussa, Colonel Gaddafi's chief of intelligence, had approached British MI6 officials seeking to negotiate WMD disarmament in exchange for normalization of ties. In early January 2004, American and British teams arrived to dismantle Libya's facilities. A delegation of seven members of the USA congress arrived in Libya on 24 January on a goodwill visit, the first in thirty years. Congressman Tom Lantos met with Colonel Gaddafi and called for a normalization of relations the following day. 7.3 These developments represent progress towards halting the spread of nuclear weapons, as well as showing that the USA is prepared to negotiate with regimes it had previously vowed to overthrow. It could be argued that Libya has responded in this way because they feared that they could be the next target for America’s war on terrorism or, alternatively, because the USA is so tied down in Iraq that the administration finds it necessary to seek diplomatic solutions for other situations. The latter option is the more likely. Libya does not want to be seen as an outcast and Colonel Gaddafi realized that, to survive, he needed Western investment and Western markets. His acceptance of responsibility for the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie led to the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999, but it became clear that he would also have to end his pursuit of nuclear and chemical weapons before the USA would lift its sanctions. The evidence indicates that the greatest incentive was restoring economic relations. 7.4 While we accept that it was not the same dealing with Saddam Hussein as with Colonel Gaddafi, it is worth noting that the process of diplomacy in Iraq, along with the work of the weapons inspectors, was halted by the rush to war there. There is tragic irony in the fact that Libya had a nuclear weapons programme which could have posed a real danger to the world, but the situation has been dealt with diplomatically. It seems extraordinary that Iraq was attacked when it appears to have had no weapons of mass destruction and did not, in fact, pose a significant danger. 7.5 Following the Lockerbie settlement, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stated: “Libya's decision to comply with these demands is the result of patient but firm diplomacy based on some clear points of principle. It demonstrates that terrorists will be brought to justice. It shows that it is possible to resolve serious issues through commitment, dialogue and co-operation.”x We would endorse these remarks, while begging the question of why such an approach was not pursued with regard to Iraq. 8. North Korea 8.1 The question “why attack Iraq?” and not other states considered to be dangerous has been posed especially in relation to North Korea. North Korea’s decisions to restart nuclear installations at Yongbyon that were shut down under the USA-North Korean Agreed Framework of 1994 and to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) create an acute foreign policy problem for the USA. In December 2002 it removed the IAEA safeguard seals at the nuclear research centre in Yongbyon, shut down the monitoring cameras, and ordered the IAEA inspectors out of the country. Restarting the Yongbyon facilities opens up a possible North Korean intent to stage a “nuclear breakout” of its nuclear programme and openly produce nuclear weapons. North Korea claimed in April 2003 that it had nuclear weapons and that it had nearly completed reprocessing of 8,000 nuclear fuel rods. 8.2 The main elements of Bush Administration policy are terminating the Agreed Framework, no negotiations with North Korea until it dismantles its nuclear program, assembling an international coalition to apply economic pressure on North Korea, planning for future economic sanctions and military action against North Korea; and warning North Korea not to reprocess nuclear weapons-grade plutonium, including asserting that “all options are open,” including military options. China, South Korea, and Russia have criticized the Bush Administration for not negotiating directly with North Korea, and they voiced opposition to economic sanctions and to the use of force against Pyongyang. 8.3 According to the Bulletin of Nuclear Scientists: “A nuclear-armed North Korea could trigger an arms race in East Asia and beyond. It could harden the U.S. posture toward North Korea and reinvigorate the extended nuclear deterrence strategies in the region. Worse, Japan might decide to undertake a nuclear weapons program of its own, which would surely provoke a Chinese response, which in turn could cause reverberations in India and Pakistan. There could also be repercussions in Taiwan and South Korea, both of which had fledgling nuclear weapons programs of their own before U.S. pressure forced their termination. Perhaps the larger danger: North Korea could sell its plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or finished weapons to other countries or terrorists.”xi 8.4 Due to the mercurial nature of the regime, it is very difficult to deal diplomatically with North Korea and almost impossible to predict their intentions. It is now highly unlikely, in the light of the present situation in Iraq, that the USA would launch any military action against the regime. The long term solution has to be diplomacy designed to contain North Korea and encourage it to come back into the NPT. 9. Iran 9.1 The USA State Department describes Iran as the world's "most active state sponsor of terrorism.” However, relations between the USA and Iran have improved slightly following the devastating earthquake in Bam on 26 December 2003. As well as providing humanitarian assistance to Iran, which Tehran accepted, the USA ordered a temporary easing of trade restrictions on Iran in order to facilitate the delivery of aid. The improvement in recent years of relations between Iran and the Arab states is a positive development, ending, as it does, Iran's isolation in the Middle East. 9.2 The USA's source of major concern with respect to Iran is its nuclear programme. In August 2002, the National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI), a group which opposes the Iranian regime, held a press conference at which it revealed the existence of two previously secret nuclear facilities in Iran, together with details about the organisational structure and the front companies Iran had established to procure materials and equipment for these facilities. 9.3 Over the summer of 2003, the UK, France and Germany initiated a co-ordinated effort to encourage Iran to agree to what was known as the Additional Protocol. This began on 4 August, with a joint letter from the three Governments. On 21 October 2003, the UK Foreign Secretary, together with his French and German counterparts, visited Tehran to negotiate with the Iranian authorities a joint EU initiative of symbolic and practical importance. 9.4 The three foreign ministers met President Khatami, Foreign Minister Kharrazi and the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Committee, Hassan Rouhani. The discussions were aimed at underlining to the Iranian authorities the concerns of the international community regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions. At the end of the visit, Iran agreed in a joint statement to comply with the three key elements of an IAEA board resolution of 12 September 2003 in order to engage in full co-operation with the IAEA, to sign the IAEA additional protocol, commence ratification procedures and suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. 9.5 The main relevance of the Iran nuclear issue to the war against terror is that it represents a “test case” of how the international community can address a state suspected of contravening international arms control agreements and developing WMD’s without the use of military force. While the USA has included Iran within the "axis of evil" and has no direct relationship with the Iranian authorities, the UK has pursued a policy of intensive, critical engagement. The UK has also chosen to distance itself from the most aggressive USA statements on Iran, instead choosing to address the question of Iran's nuclear programme in close alignment with its two major European partners. Such an approach is commendable. 10. Syria 10.1 In the immediate aftermath of the war, there were some indications from the Bush administration that Syria could be the next target. The USA placed Syria on its list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1979, although it has maintained largely normal diplomatic relations since. Syria and Israel have technically been at war for many years and a raid against Syria by Israel in October 2003 was not condemned by George Bush. 10.2 While the problems following the ending of the Iraq war should deter the USA from further military action, the imposition of sanctions was due to begin at the time of writing this report. The sanctions fall under the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, passed by Congress in November 2003, and signed by President Bush in December to punish the Damascus government. The USA maintains that Syria sponsors terrorism, is developing non-conventional weapons, and has failed to stop anti-American fighters from crossing into Iraq. It is believed that Hamas and other radical Palestinian factions have facilities in Damascus, but the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, insisted on a visit to the UK that they are press offices. Israel claimed its bombing raid was against a training camp used by Islamic Jihad. Syria is also believed to support the terrorist group Hezbollah. 10.3 Syria is far from being the pariah state in the sense that Saddam Hussein's Iraq was. It supported UN Security Council resolution 1441 to return weapons inspectors to Iraq and has shared intelligence leading to the arrest or capture of al-Qaeda suspects. Yet there is widespread scepticism in the USA administration about President Assad, especially as to whether he has sufficient power within Syria to make the changes necessary to satisfy the West. Demands include the withdrawal of Syrian forces from the Lebanon, an end to support for Hezbollah and groups fighting against Israel and the abandonment of its alleged chemical and biological weapons programmes. 10.4 Once again, it is notable that the UK has sought to improve relations with Syria, while the USA has taken a more hawkish stance. This led to an embarrassing moment for Tony Blair when President Assad was strongly critical of his Iraq policy at a joint press conference. Nevertheless, as a Committee, we believe strongly that the approach being adopted by the UK government will yield more results and create greater opportunities for further dialogue than the USA approach of military threats and sanctions. 11. Security and Danger 11.1 International terrorism is sometimes portrayed by politicians as the greatest threat facing humanity at this time. It is, of course, one of a number of major threats facing us, alongside others such as poverty in developing nations, major diseases like HIV/AIDS and the threat to the earth’s environment caused by global warming. Around 4,000 people have been killed by terrorists since 11 September, 2001, including those killed in the USA on that day. In the same period, millions have died through poverty, disease and other conflicts and uprisings around the world. It is incumbent on governments to protect their people and warn them of the dangers; at the same time there has to be a balance between doing so and keeping the threat in perspective, since creating fear and uncertainty is a key task of terrorist organisations. 11.2 We commend the efforts of the police and security services who work tirelessly to try to prevent a terrorist attack and seek to protect innocent people. Measures to increase security which do not infringe human rights should be strongly supported. However, it is still the view of the Church and Nation Committee that aspects of the so-called war on terror by political leaders have been grossly mishandled and have played into the hands of terrorists. 11.3 Calling the efforts to tackle terrorism a war was a major error of judgement. The belief that terrorism can be overcome through attacking states which harbour them has been shown to be ineffective. Terrorists can operate across the world in complex networks which do not require sympathetic governments to shield them. Al Qaeda operates as a "network of networks", across sixty countries, working in various types of cell structure and represents a movement that links itself to history, rather than a campaign that pursues politically achievable objectives. Terrorists also thrive on publicity and the rhetoric used by politicians often gives terrorists even more of the publicity and attention which they crave. The abuse of human rights, such as the holding of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and Belmarsh Prison in the UK, means that governments lose the moral high ground and begin to stoop to the same level as the terrorist. These policies, alongside inflammatory language, cause resentment among Muslim communities in which the vast majority of people are opposed to terrorism. It is significant that UK opinion polls indicate that large numbers of Muslim voters are turning away from the Labour Party. 11.4 The greatest mistake in this so-called war on terror was the invasion and occupation of Iraq. We believe that this war was a monumental folly on the part of the USA and the other supporting governments. Despite there being no connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda, despite the warnings that it would simply increase the terrorist threat, despite the knowledge that it would probably lead to substantial loss of life, the USA and its partners still went ahead. There was no UN backing and many international lawyers believe it was an illegal war; there were no weapons of mass destruction; there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein and huge numbers of ordinary people protested against it across the world. Yet still the war went ahead. 11.5 Despite the decision of the Spanish government to withdraw its troops by June 2004 if a handover of power has not been completed by then, we believe that the occupying powers must remain in Iraq in order to maintain security and support the task of reconstruction. However, we strongly believe that the United Nations should be given the leading rôle in the reconstruction of Iraq. 11.6 Those who argue that violence only begets more violence are often labelled as naïve and foolhardy. However, it is our view that it has been our political leaders who have shown naïvety in key aspects of their response to international terrorism. Through the failure of certain governments to find non-military means of tackling terrorism, the world has not been made a safer place but an even more dangerous one. 12. Security and Liberty 12.1 Following the 11 September attacks, the USA Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act) in order to help combat the terrorist threat. While many of its provisions are sensible in seeking to overcome terrorism, some aspects have been severely criticised. The federal commission investigating the 11 September attacks has heard testimony from several prominent law professors on the dangers of the Act. The former Vice President Al Gore called for the Act's repeal, accusing the Bush administration of suspending civil liberties and claiming that the government was using "fear as a political tool to consolidate its power and to escape any accountability for its use." Many cities have refused to assist the federal government in its implementation. The fact that the USA can hold suspected terrorists without trial is among the most worrying of the Act’s provisions. According to the New York Times Magazine of 23 February 2003, “An American citizen suspected of being part of a terrorist conspiracy could be held by investigators without anyone being notified. He could simply disappear.” 12.2 A second Act, which sought to tighten and advance some of the provisions of the first one, had to be abandoned after considerable protests were made. However, some of its provisions have been quietly inserted into other legislation such as the Justice Enhancement and Domestic Security Act of 2003 and the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 which grants the FBI unprecedented power to obtain records from financial institutions without requiring permission from a judge. Those who support these Acts argue that if they marginally reduce peacetime liberties, then this is a reasonable price to pay for a valuable weapon against al-Qaeda. However, the question of whether such legislation actually helps to overcome terrorism is open to debate. 12.3 The UK has lived with the threat of terrorism for a long time. For many years that threat was associated with the situation in Northern Ireland. In recent times, however, the greater threat is perceived to come from Al-Qaeda and associated extremist groups, leading to repeated warnings from senior police officers about the severity of the threat and the need to be prepared. That fear has been brought into sharp focus by the bombings in Madrid. In the wake of those events Ken Livingstone, the Mayor of London, said that it would be “miraculous” if London were to escape a terrorist attack. 12.4 There is undoubtedly a threat from those who regard the use of extreme and indiscriminate violence as a means of advancing a cause. There is nothing illusory about the anguish and injuries of those caught up in terrorist offences. However, members of the public do not know and cannot know what the real extent of that threat is. That is so for two reasons. First, it is not absolutely knowable. Intelligence work can only take protection so far; there is always the possibility, as in Madrid, of a surprise attack. Secondly, the Government does not consider it appropriate to make public all the information in its possession relating to the nature and extent of that threat. 12.5 Whilst much anti-terrorist work is carried out in secret by the Government, there is an anxiety on its part that the public should be aware both of the need to be vigilant and of the measures it has put in place to secure public protection. Among the most controversial of the steps which have been taken by the Government and which are known to the public are changes to legislation to allow for the detention without charge of foreign nationals. 12.6 The critical legislation is the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. In terms of sections 21 to 23 of that Act, a foreign national may be certified by the Secretary of State as a terrorist on the basis of suspicion of being involved in terrorist activities. Such a person may be detained without charge and without limit of time. This is and is recognised to be a power which is contrary to normal constitutional freedoms. It is incompatible with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to liberty) and this has necessitated a derogation, whereby the Government gives notice that it is stepping outwith the provisions of the Convention. The Act also provides, at section 28, for regular review of its effects. Two review reports have now been published. In addition, because the Act was introduced as emergency legislation, arrangements for an independent Privy Council review were also put in place in terms of section 122 of the Act. That review was carried out by a committee headed by Lord Newton and the report was released in December 2003. It is, in large part, critical of the Act and recommends alternative means of dealing with the terrorist problem. In particular, it suggests that replacement legislation be introduced which would not require a derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights. The Newton Committee was concerned at, among other things, the distinctions drawn between foreign nationals and UK citizens. Recognising the continuing need for special counter-terrorism legislation, the Committee concluded that such legislation should be: * kept distinct from mainstream criminal law; * limited to dealing with terrorism; * accompanied by tailored safeguards; * consistent with collective counter-terrorism policies agreed and coordinated by the international community. 12.7 The Government’s responses are set out in its recently issued discussion paper, “Counter-terrorism powers: reconciling security and liberty in an open society”. The Government has considered and rejected those parts of the Newton report which suggest that the Government’s powers have become too draconian – though not those parts which suggest that the Government has not gone far enough. The result of these responses is a ratchet effect in which comparison with other kinds of legislation is allowed only if the result is one which moves in the direction of security rather than liberty. The “reconciliation” of the paper’s title, therefore, would appear to have far less balance in it than the title itself might suggest. 12.8 The Act has also been considered by the House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights. That Committee has published three reports, the most recent in February 2004. It supports many of the recommendations of the section 28 review reports and the Newton report. 12.9 At present, fifteen people are detained without trial under the 2001 Act. Two people who were detained have left the UK. There are restrictions on the extent to which evidence against persons detained under the Act may be made known to them or to their legal representatives. There are provisions for appeal and review in relation to certification as a terrorist and detention under the Act. The only court able to consider such proceedings is the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), which is a part of the High Court. SIAC has doubted the legality of the Article 5 derogation. That matter has been considered further by the Court of Appeal and is now before the House of Lords. 12.10 In March 2004 a Libyan citizen , known simply as “M”, was released from Belmarsh high security prison after almost sixteen months without charge or trial. Three Appeal Court judges ruled that the Home Secretary had acted "inappropriately" and "unlawfully" in certifying him as an international terrorist. The Home Secretary contested the decision, seeking leave to appeal. After hearing the evidence, Lord Woolf refused to grant the appeal and ordered that the Home Secretary pay M's costs. He said in his ruling: “While the need for society to protect itself against acts of terrorism today is self-evident, it remains of the greatest importance that, in a society which upholds the rule of law, if a person is detained as M was detained, that individual should have access to an independent tribunal or court which can adjudicate upon the question of whether the detention is lawful or not. If it is not lawful, then he has to be released." xii M was the only one of the men to win his appeal before SIAC. In all other cases, the panel agreed with the Home Secretary's suspicions that the men were terrorists with connections to al-Qaeda. 12.11 This legislation has been subjected to an unusually high degree of scrutiny by the courts, by politicians and by independent reviewers appointed under the statute itself. That scrutiny has identified several fundamental and very serious concerns. These concerns go to the heart of principles of liberty and fairness and the rule of law and they are shared by many individuals and organisations with expertise in the field. So far, the Government has resisted suggestions for reform, citing as its reasons the imminence and severity of the threat of terrorism and the effectiveness of identifying and detaining people on suspicion of terrorist offences. 12.12 The threat is serious, it is argued, and extreme measures are needed. One of the risks of introducing and relying on extreme measures is that they slip into becoming acceptable and somehow normal. Whether these measures are necessary or not is a very slippery question. Answering that question requires two assessments, both of which are near impossible: how big is the threat and how much are we prepared to compromise? These questions are heavy with uncertainty, fear and accusation. 12.13 Amidst all this, we should not lose sight of some basic principles: * detaining people on mere suspicion is not right. * detaining people without a charge being brought and without a trial is not right. * detaining people with no limit of time is not right. * detaining people without informing them of the evidence held against them is not right. Even if, and it is a very big if, circumstances are thought to warrant such detention, that does not make it right. What is right remains right. These rights are part of the foundation of our justice system. If we remove them, we weaken the whole structure and we all lose. It is essential that our justice system is allowed to protect the rights of those whose views we might despise. If we lose that, then we lose much of what we are trying to protect. 13. Security and Vulnerability 13.1 In January 2001 the Church of Norway produced a paper entitled “Vulnerability and Security”xiii. It sought to set discussion of each of these subjects in the context of the other. It was in September 2001 that this attempt was suddenly put under the spotlight, when questions about how the centre of world power proved to be so vulnerable became questions of overwhelming importance. Since then, events in Bali, Istanbul, Madrid and elsewhere have brought home to people in very personal ways the vulnerability of life to violence and death. 13.2 There is a need for a completely new look at the relationship between vulnerability and security – and that is to recognise that security is only an issue for us because humanity is by its nature vulnerable. In this recognition comes a central, constitutive aspect of our very existence: vulnerability is what makes us compassionate, open to one another, capable of solidarity. Thus vulnerability is not something to be overcome or protected against; it is something to be cherished and valued – because vulnerability is what makes us human: “Recognition of our own vulnerability can encourage a desire for cooperation instead of conflict. Enmity and conflict are a greater temptation for the person who knows him/herself to be invulnerable.”xiv 13.3 This has implications for governments and their policies; but it also has something we need to hear as Christians, something which speaks to us of how we live in an uncertain world. It asks us to examine our attitudes to life and death, to risk and uncertainty, to existence and faith. 13.4 There are implications also concerning the insufficiency of an individualist view of security. For an individual person or an individual state to think that they can create a secure environment for themselves, while ignoring or even jeopardising the security of others, is to forget the interconnectedness of life. What several decades of ecological thinking have forced upon us, for example, is the realisation that human security is inseparable from environmental security. In the same way, we now need to come to terms with the reality that the rich world cannot buy security at the expense of the poor; either we have a shared and joint security or we have no security. Our vulnerability, in other words, is our only hope. 13.5 Without vulnerability we become monstrous and inhuman; if we are immune from or oblivious to danger, we are a danger to everyone around us. This has begun to become all too obvious in the world of economics, where one part of the world has largely succeeded in making itself invulnerable and, in the process, has failed to notice the dreadful price being paid for this elsewhere. And when the ability to use violence results from overwhelming force or high-tech distance or fanatical disregard for life, whether one’s own or that of others, the monstrosity that results is clear for all to see. To understand the world in which we live, we need always to look from the perspective and the place of the poor, the weak and the victims. Until their daily experience of total vulnerability impinges properly on the consciousness of the rich and the strong, security will be a dream and the search for it in danger of becoming a nightmare. 13.6 When we apply thoughts on vulnerability to a “war on terror” we tread dangerous and contested ground. No government can without explanation or qualification elevate vulnerability as morally desirable without quickly and correctly being accused of dereliction of duty. Their first duty is to protect their citizens. The question, however, is how that is best achieved. And for that question to receive an adequate answer it is important not only for governments but also for all of us that the aim of protection is delineated. 13.7 Such protection is protection of our democracy, our freedom and indeed our vulnerability. If terrorism results in the abandonment of any of these, it has achieved at least a partial victory; because the more draconian the response, the greater the claimed legitimation of further terrorism will be. “That is why,” the paper says, “terrorism must be repulsed in a manner that rejects the very essence and methods of terrorism.”xv Therefore: * because terrorism rejects the rule of law, the rule of law must be paramount in opposing it; * because terrorism thrives on “crude, false images of reality”, caricature must never be used in response; * because terrorism attacks without discrimination, only the guilty must be held responsible; * because terrorism creates discord, it must be met by cooperation and consensus. 13.8 Above all, because terrorism thrives on the view that “my beliefs are worth more than your life”, the importance of life in all its vulnerability must constantly be part of our understanding and the driving force behind our actions. For governments to feel able to resist being dragged down by violence and division, they must have the support and the understanding of all of us in upholding the rule of law and the positive affirmation of diversity. Hatred cannot be answered by xenophobia. 13.9 The God-given human life we share on this planet is by its nature vulnerable; it cannot be otherwise. When we search for ways of living in dangerous times, we believe that for the Church such a search must begin and end with our faith. That faith is built on the belief that God shared our vulnerability and, in refusing to avoid it, realised its true potential. When we search for security, we can do so only on the basis of the solidarity of shared vulnerability that may indeed open us to danger and death, but that also makes possible true humanity and real life. i International Law Dictionary and Directory ii The Guardian, March 16 2004 iii Speech at Nixon Center Distinguished Service Award Banquet, from the CIA web site iv Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, December 30 2003 v Christian Aid Submission to the International Development Committee Enquiry on Afghanistan vi The Guardian, October 10 2001 vii Article 99, Geneva Convention viii Foreign Affairs, January/February 2004, pages 2-6 ix Oxfam Briefing Paper 48, A Fresh Start for Iraq: The Case for Debt Relief, May 2003 x News Release, 10 Downing Street web site, 12 September 2003 xi Bulletin of Nuclear Scientists, March/April 2003, Vol. 59, No.2, pp. 74–77 xii The Guardian, March 19, 2004 xiii Vulnerability and Security. Current challenges in securing policy from an ethical and theological perspective. Prepared by the Commission on International Affairs in Church of Norway Council on Ecumenical and International Relations. xiv Ibid. xv Ibid.