TRIDENT 
UK nuclear weapons at a crossroads 
This briefing has been compiled with the intention of 
informing the public debate on the future of the UK nuclear 
weapons programme. It seeks to provide information and 
analysis with respect to strategic decisions that will shortly 
need to be made and reflects the consistent concern of the 
churches over many years. 

1. Our Nuclear Weapons 
Britain’s nuclear weapons system 
comprises submarines, missiles and 
warheads. The UK has 58 Trident D5 
missiles acquired from the USA under the 
Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA). The 
UK has developed its own stockpile of 
nuclear warheads, each one about eight 
times more powerful than the Hiroshima 
bomb. The missiles are launched from 4 
Vanguard class submarines (HMS 
Vanguard, Vigilant, Victorious and 
Vengeance) of which one is on patrol at 
any one time. They carry a stock of up to 
48 warheads while on patrol. 
2. Why Now? 
The submarines are expected to last until 
the mid-2020s although their useable 
lifespan could be extended with 
refurbishment. The fact that it takes a 
long time to design, assess, develop and 
procure a new system means that a 
decision on the future of the current 
system needs to be taken soon. The 
Government has indicated that a decision 
is likely to be made during the lifetime of 
this Parliament i.e. before 2009. 
Using the Whitehall language of ‘Smart 
Acquisition’, the Ministry of Defence 
(MOD) would need to commit to a 
Development and Manufacture Phase for 
a replacement launch system around 
2015. A decision to embark on an 
Assessment Phase of a very small and 
specific number of options would need to 
be taken around 2010. In view of this, the 
MOD needs to decide fairly soon whether 
to embark on a Concept Phase that will 
determine the specific options to be 
addressed during the Assessment Phase. 
The main procurement investment 
decision would need to be taken in 2015. 
This is likely to commit at least 85% of the 
total procurement cost. The bulk of the 
remaining 15% would be committed in 
2010 with only a few percent of the total 
set aside to fund the concept phase. 
3. The Churches’ Objective: Debate 
and Transparency 
Given the strategic and ethical importance 
of this decision as well as the financial 
implications of replacing or updating our 
nuclear weapons there is a need for 
greater transparency and accountability. 
While the Secretary of State for Defence 
has endorsed a Parliamentary debate, the 
Government maintain that it is they who 
will make the final decision1. 
I
n previous years the UK government has 
closely guarded its thinking on nuclear 
arms and possible future options. Several 
churches have called for a wide public 
debate on the issue and the government’s 
support for such a debate is welcome. 
However this debate could achieve better 
focus if the government were to be more 
open with respect to information on 
options and costs. The government could 
further demonstrate transparency by 
authorising Ministers to give evidence 
before the Defence Select Committee 
enquiring into the decision. 
In 2002-2003 the Ministry of Defence 
conducted concept studies at a cost of 
£560,000 on possible future platforms to 
carry nuclear warheads. This research 
could pave the way for an alternative to 
the current submarine system. If the 
results of this research were made 
available to the wider public it might better 
inform the current debate. 
I
n 2005 Defence Secretary John Reid 
announced a £1 billion 3-year investment 
programme to upgrade facilities at the 
Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at 
Aldermaston. The 
Government say 
this is to ensure 
the reliability and 
safety of existing 
warheads, but they 
could also be used 
to help design and 
produce new 
warheads. 
The public debate should consider all 
options including non-replacement, 
looking at whether the life span of the 
submarines and missiles could be 
While the Secretary of 
State for Defence has 
endorsed a 
Parliamentary debate, 
the Government state 
that it is they who will 
make the final decision. 

extended and, if replacement is to go 
ahead, the nature of any new system. 
This decision will shape the future of 
Britain’s nuclear capability, defence 
strategy and relations with other countries 
for decades to come. 
4. Non-proliferation 
The UK is a state party to the 1968 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an 
international agreement aimed at 
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons 
and on working towards disarmament. 
Although the treaty 
faces constant challenges 
it has been 
largely successful in 
limiting the spread of 
nuclear weapons over 
the past thirty years. 
More countries have ratified the NPT than 
any other international treaty. Only four 
states are not party to the agreement 
(India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan). 
All four either have or are thought to be 
developing a nuclear weapons capability. 
The NPT requires that, "Each of the 
parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue 
negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date and on 
a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective 
control." It therefore obliges the UK and 
the other nuclear weapons states to 
pursue nuclear disarmament. It also 
obliges non-nuclear weapons states that 
are parties to the treaty not to receive or 
manufacture nuclear weapons. 
North Korea claims to have developed 
nuclear weapons; Iran is widely believed 
to aspire to a nuclear weapons capability 
but denies this. The acknowledged 
nuclear weapon states (China, France, 
Russia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States) consider nuclear weapons 
to be central to their national security 
strategies and maintain active research 
and development programmes in nuclear 
weapons technology. Arguments have 
been made that such programmes 
contravene the obligations that the NPT 
imposes. 
Every 5 years the NPT is reviewed. The 
2000 treaty review reached agreement on 
a set of 13 steps to non-proliferation 
however the 2005 treaty review failed to 
make any meaningful progress. The 
commitments made by state parties in 
2000 remain. 
I
n the 2000 treaty review non-nuclear 
states reaffirmed their obligations not to 
acquire nuclear weapons while nuclear 
weapons states recognised the 
correspondi ng legal ly binding 
commitments to disarmament. In 2005, 
the Head of the UK delegation confirmed 
support for this position when he noted 
that "non-proliferation and disarmament 
are inter-linked in achieving the Treaty’s 
objectives.2" It is generally accepted that 
enhancing nuclear weapons systems 
would undermine an objective to "bring to 
a conclusion negotiations leading to 
nuclear disarmament in all its 
aspects" and provide a material breach of 
the Treaty. The UK’s continued adherence 
to the NPT would at one level appear to 
preclude an enhancement of the Trident 
system although not, some would argue, a 
replacement of Trident with a similar 
system3. 
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) prohibits the UK from testing new 
nuclear warheads by 
explosion. However 
as long as any decision 
taken by the UK 
does not involve testing 
then the UK would 
not be breaking the 
CTBT. 
5. Issues, arguments & analysis 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
and international law 
In 1996 the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) gave an advisory opinion on whether 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons is 
permitted under international law. The 
ICJ started from the point that any threat 
More countries have 
ratified the NPT than 
any other 
international treaty 
Enhancing nuclear 
weapons would 
undermine the UK’s 
commitment to the 
NPT 

or use of force in contravention of Article 
2, paragraph 4 of the UN charter and 
which fails to meet Article 51 of that 
charter is unlawful. However, the court 
could not conclude definitively “whether 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme 
circumstance of self-defence, in which the 
very survival of a State would be at stake”. 
While Article VI of the NPT may appear 
rather vague in its disarmament 
commitments, the nuclear weapon states 
are required to undertake good-faith 
negotiations leading to the “cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date and 
to nuclear disarmament.” The ICJ 
reaffirmed the disarmament obligations on 
the nuclear weapon states under the NPT. 
Advisory opinions are not legally binding, 
although some would use the ruling in 
support of the ethical argument for 
disarmament. The 2000 NPT review 
conference built on the court’s 
interpretation of the NPT’s legal 
obligations in a 13-paragraph section of 
the final document, for which both the 
United Kingdom and United States 
credited themselves with having played a 
constructive role, working with key nonnuclear-
weapon states to strengthen the 
NPT. 
The Strategic Context 
The world political context has altered 
significantly since the end of the Cold 
War. An assessment of current and 
foreseeable threats will inevitably be part 
of any consideration 
of appropriate 
measures 
for defence. 
Although China 
and Russia, in 
common with the 
US, still possess 
s u b s t a n t i a l 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons they do not 
currently present a threat to our national 
security. Some argue that retaining or 
replacing nuclear weapons offers limited 
benefit for the defence of the United 
Kingdom today. It is more difficult to 
assess whether major nuclear powers 
could present a threat to the UK in the 
future. Nuclear weapons are perceived as 
having a political function in preventing a 
major war between nation states. It is 
difficult to conceive of a scenario in which 
they could have utility in combating 
terrorism, which is now a primary security 
concern. Arguments frequently put 
forward for the retention of an 
independent deterrent are as much 
concerned with our influence on the world 
stage and within the UN, as on national 
security. Some would take the view that 
by maintaining Britain’s position of 
influence in the international community, 
we can encourage other nations to adopt 
democratic political systems and live up to 
human rights obligations. Some would go 
further and argue that while the geopolitical 
environment has changed 
significantly since Trident was initially 
commissioned, the potential of 
proliferating states and failing states with 
nuclear weapons poses a significant and 
real threat that requires Britain to maintain 
adequate forces to deter nuclear and nonnuclear 
aggression. (While it is feasible 
that the possession of a nuclear arsenal 
by one party could have had a bearing on 
the progression of conflicts fought entirely 
with conventional arms, there are 
significant ethical dilemmas around the 
threat or use of nuclear arms in response 
to aggression by non-nuclear states). 
Others however would place greater 
emphasis on maintaining a strong nonproliferation 
regime and fear that this 
could break down catastrophically if the 
current nuclear powers insist on 
maintaining their nuclear arsenals. 
The Costs 
Both supporters and opponents of Trident 
recognise that, even when spread over 
several years, the development costs of 
replacing our current system would be 
considerable. It has been estimated that 
a replacement of Trident would run to 
many billions of pounds. The cost of 
staffing and management of any new 
system is also a factor for consideration. 
According to the Government’s Strategic 
Defence Review (1998) Trident currently 
costs £680 million per year to maintain. 
Some government reports indicate the 
annual cost may be somewhat higher4. 
It is difficult to assess 
whether major nuclear 
powers could present a 
threat to the UK in the 
future. 

6. Church Statements & Christian 
Ethics 
While not every Church has taken a 
position on nuclear weapons a number of 
general observations may be made. 
On many points 
r e l a t i n g to 
nuclear weapons 
and disarmament, 
the 
churches have 
been in general 
agreement. 
· From a Christian perspective, the 
‘foundations of authentic peace rest on 
the truth about God and man.’5 Views 
about UK nuclear weapons policy 
should be determined in the light of the 
Gospel and informed by security needs 
of the nation and the wider world. 
· The Gospel, as well as much of the 
Christian moral reasoning that has 
arisen from it, entails a presumption 
against violence. It follows that the 
goal of the global abolition of nuclear 
weapons is widely affirmed. 
· The physical security of populations is 
a legitimate Christian concern and a 
duty of Government to assure. 
· Decisions about UK nuclear weapons 
policy should not be taken in private but 
‘opened-up to democratic scrutiny and 
public debate’6. 
· The actions of the acknowledged 
Nuclear Weapons States (China, 
France, Russia, UK and USA) as a 
group have fallen short of their 
obligations under the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty to negotiate 
disarmament. 
The historic ‘Peace Churches’ – Brethren, 
Mennonites and Quakers – believe that 
there is no ethical, practical or theological 
justification for nuclear weapons. The 
pacifist strand in other churches – 
represented by organisations such as the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation and Pax 
Christi, among others – shares this view. 
Within other Christian traditions views 
about nuclear weapons are more divided. 
Some would argue for progressive nuclear 
disarmament consisting of multilateral 
balanced reduction of weapons in the 
context of multilateral negotiations. 
Others would favour unilateral measures 
while pursuing such negotiations. 
Among the Churches advocating the nonreplacement 
of Trident is the Church of 
Scotland, whose position is one of 
‘sustained opposition’ to nuclear weapons. 
On 23 May 2001, the Church called on the 
UK Government ‘to abandon the Trident 
programme’7. In May 2006, churches in 
Scotland united in their opposition to a 
replacement of the Trident nuclear 
weapons system. The Church of 
Scotland, the Catholic Church and 
Episcopal Church signed the petition at 
Holyrood, Edinburgh, stating "We urge the 
government of the United Kingdom not to 
invest in a replacement for the Trident 
system and to begin now the process of 
decommissioning these weapons with the 
intention of diverting the sums spent on 
nuclear weaponry to programmes of aid 
and development." 
In January 2006, Pope Benedict XVI 
described the policy of relying on nuclear 
weapons as `not only baneful but 
completely fallacious’ and called for ‘a 
progressive and concerted nuclear 
disarmament’8. 
On 30 April 2005, a letter published in The 
Guardian from five Church leaders 
reflected similar concern. Signed by the 
Archbishop of Wales and Presidents/ 
Moderators of the Baptist, Methodist and 
United Reformed Churches and the 
Church of 
Scotland, the 
letter encouraged 
the UK to 
move towards 
nuclear disarmament: 
‘The 
cause of nonpr 
o l i f eration 
could gain significant 
impetus were the UK, despite the 
reductions in our nuclear capability since 
the end of the Cold War, to spell out the 
conditions under which the UK might be 
content to forego a replacement of 
Trident.’ 
Some adherents of the Christian Just War 
The physical security of 
populations is a legitimate 
Christian concern and a 
duty of Government to 
assure. 
Many believe that the logic 
of nuclear deterrence is 
ultimately a fully nucleararmed 
world and thus a 
probable nuclear conflict to 
the detriment of all. 

tradition consider that the destructive 
potential of nuclear weapons always 
precludes their threat or use within the 
meaning of the Just War criteria9 while 
others consider nuclear weapons to be an 
acceptable although imperfect means for 
delivering national security. Whilst 
af f i rming the 
Gospel imperative 
of striving for the 
a b o l i t i o n of 
nuclear weapons, 
a case may be 
made that nuclear 
deterrence is both 
prudent and just 
within an inter-national situation 
characterised by emerging threats and 
tensions. This is also the UK 
Government’s policy. 
The Church of England’s General Synod’s 
position was established in 1983: ‘…it is 
the duty of Her Majesty’s Government and 
her allies to maintain adequate forces to 
guard against nuclear blackmail and to 
deter nuclear and non-nuclear 
aggressors.’10 It also stated that: NATO’s 
nuclear posture should be ‘unmistakably 
defensive’ in nature; any ‘first use’ of 
nuclear weapons would be unacceptable; 
and nuclear deterrence should not 
preclude multilateral efforts towards 
disarmament. A House of Bishops report 
in September 2005 called for religious 
leaders ‘to assist in developing a wider 
conversation than currently exists on the 
ethics of procuring, manufacturing and 
possessing nuclear weapons.’11 It stated 
that the nuclear weapons debate ‘needs 
to be conducted with much greater 
honesty and consistency’.12 
7. Questions 
The following questions have been 
included in this briefing to stimulate and 
structure debate between Christians and 
to assist those who have yet to form an 
opinion on the decision facing the UK. 
I
s it still morally justifiable to hold or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons in the 
post-Cold War era? What are the ethical 
questions surrounding the current 
government position that the UK should, 
for the foreseeable future, retain a 
minimum nuclear deterrent in order to 
guard against future threats? 
What considerations should be taken into 
account in deciding on a replacement of 
Trident? 
How in practice could the UK maintain its 
international obligations to negotiate 
nuclear disarmament while investing in a 
replacement of the Trident nuclear 
weapons system? 
If the UK were to dispense with an 
independent nuclear deterrent how can 
the Government provide security in the 
face of external nuclear threats? 
What form of advice would church 
members like their Churches to offer 
government? Should churches advocate 
specific policy options or highlight moral 
concerns? 
8. What can the Churches do? 
The church at various levels can: - 
• Help congregations to make sense 
of the issues and respond 
accordingly. 
• Provide opportunity for prayer and 
reflection on these issues within 
liturgy, worship and study groups. 
• Write to members of Parliament 
asking them to use every 
opportunity to influence the 
Government in the House of Lords 
or Commons. 
• Make submissions to the House of 
Commons Defence Committee and 
engage with Parliament as this topic 
is debated. 
“The nuclear weapons 
debate needs to be 
conducted with much 
greater honesty and 
consistency” 

9. Resources 
Christian Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament 
http://www.ccnd.gn.apc.org/ 
Christian Council for Approaches to 
Defence and Disarmament (CCADD) 
http://website.lineone.net/~ccadd/ 
The Acronym Institute for Disarmament 
Diplomacy 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/ 
British American Security Information 
Council 
http://www.basicint.org/ 
Oxford Research Group 
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/ 
WMD Awareness Programme 
http://www.comeclean.org.uk/ 
Endnotes 
1 Prime Minister’s Questions (Hansard 19 
Oct 2005 : Column 841) 
2 Ambassador John Freeman, Head of the 
UK Delegation, to the Seventh Review 
Conference of the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 
2005, (See http://www.un.org/events/ 
npt2005/statements/npt05unitedkingdom. 
pdf) 
3 Legal opinion is divided on this point (see 
h t t p : //com e c l e a n . o r g . u k / c o n t e n t / 
JOINT_OPINION.doc) 
4 The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence 
(Lord Gilbert): Hansard, House of Lords, 
9th December 1997, 2.44 pm. 
5 Pope Benedict XVI, Message for the 
Celebration of World Day of Peace, 1 
January 2006 
6 Letter from five Church leaders published in 
The Guardian, 30 April 2005. 
7 Church of Scotland General Assembly, 23 
May 2001 
8 Pope Benedict XVI, Message for the 
Celebration of World Day of Peace, 1 
January 2006 
9 See for example Bishop of Salisbury et al, 
The Church and the Bomb: Nuclear 
weapons and Christian conscience 
(London: CIO, 1982), Chapter 5. 
10 General Synod Report of Proceedings, Vol. 
14, 1983. 
11 Church of England House of Bishops, 
Countering Terrorism: Power, Violence And 
Democracy Post 9/11 (September 2005), 
p.88 
12 ibid. p.74 
Final Version June 2006 
This resource has been prepared by representatives of member churches of Churches Together 
in Britain and Ireland including the Baptist Union of Great Britain, the Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference of England and Wales, the Mission and Public Affairs Division of the Church of 
England’s Archbishops’ Council, the Church of Scotland, the Methodist Church, the Religious 
Society of Friends (Quakers) and the United Reformed Church. 
The Decade to Overcome Violence is an 
initiative of the World Council of Churches, 
an ecumenical fellowship of churches 
founded in 1948, bringing together 348 
Protestant, Orthodox, Anglican and other 
churches representing more than 560 million 
Christians in over 110 countries, and 
working cooperatively with the Roman 
Catholic Church. 
www.overcomingviolence.org