Iran Church of Scotland Church and Society Council Church and Society Council Church of Scotland 121 George Street, Edinburgh, EH2 4YN Phone: 0131 225 5722 www.churchofscotland.org.uk Charity Number: SC011353 May 2008 1. Introduction 1.1 The Middle East is beset by crises. “The war between Hizbullah and Israel, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, the instability in Iraq and the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme create a climate of deep unease. Iran is involved in all these crises to a greater or lesser degree, and its regional role is significant and growing.”1 1.2 Iran is seldom out of the news these days, but what do we know of this country? The name may conjure up simplistic images, forged by the Islamic Revolution of 1979, of a country rigidly controlled by Islamic clerics, where the US is identified as ‘the Great Satan’; the naming by President Bush of Iran as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’ helped to identify Iran as a threat to the western world; the fiery rhetoric of the current President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has done little to dispel these fears. Tension has been ratcheted up over claims that Iran is intent on developing its own nuclear weapons, and Iran is blamed for supporting terrorism in the Middle East, and for destabilising the current regime in Iraq. With Iraq now disempowered because of the war, Iran is clearly the strongest country in the region; with the invasion of Iraq, the US is now a player in the same region. Is what we are seeing really a ‘clash of civilisations’ or merely two large nations jostling for power in a particularly volatile area? 1.3 This paper seeks to look beyond the headlines at the country, its past and present, and to understand what has led to the current tension. It also aims to highlight the very real threat to the world should this tension escalate into the outbreak of hostilities. Historical Background 1.4 Iran (formerly Persia) has a long and proud history dating back to the 4th millennium BC; the Persian king Cyrus (‘the Great’ - 6th Century BC) appears in the Book of Ezra, which acknowledges his part in liberating the Jews from slavery in Babylon; the Persian or Achaemenid empire (330 BC – 226 AD) was one of the great civilisations in the ancient world, and its successor the Sassanid empire was recognised by Rome as a second superpower. With the arrival of the Islamic religion, Persian culture was sufficiently robust to influence the development of this new religion and, in 1588, the Safavid ruler Shah Abbas made Shi-ism the state religion. Iran remains today the leading Shia nation of the world. 1.5 In 1921, Reza Khan, a military officer in Persia's Cossack Brigade, named himself Shah of Persia, after successfully staging a coup against the government of the Qajar Dynasty. He immediately launched an ambitious campaign to modernize the country. Persia was officially renamed Iran in 1935. In 1953, the hugely popular politician (and democratically elected Prime Minister) Muhammed Mossadegh was overthrown with the blatant help of the CIA; the US and Britain were concerned at his plans to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil company. In 1979 the Islamic Revolution saw the exile of the pro-western and repressive Shah and the introduction of clerical rule, with Ayatollah Khomeini returning from exile in France to become Supreme Leader. This was also the date of the US Embassy hostage crisis, which lasted for 444 days. From 1980–1988, the Iran-Iraq war (triggered by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of his neighbouring country) took the lives of 750,000 Iranians and maimed millions more. All of these events remain significant in the minds of many Iranians. 1.6 Iran today has a population of 71 million, of whom 47 million are below the age of 25. There are a number of minorities within the country (The largest minorities are the Azeris (24%), Kurds (7%), Arabs (3%), Baluchis (2%) and Turkmens (1%).) Most of these would, however consider themselves full Iranians. There is also a population of about 2 million (3%) Afghan refugees, each with their own concerns. Iranians are proud of their Persian heritage, fiercely nationalistic, with a real sense of imperial mission and destiny. Iran is not an Arab country, and this can lead to a sense of superiority over Arab neighbours. It has a strong cultural identity, and an educated population; 60% of university students are women, and there is a proud tradition of civil debate within the population. Despite the increasing repression of critics of the government (see Human Rights below) Iranians continue to express their views, embracing the new technologies which allow them to do so; Iran has the highest number of bloggers in the world. Yet despite the internal criticism of its government, there is little doubt that Iranian society would unite against any common enemy who attacked them, and rally behind their government to combat any aggressor. 2. Iran’s Relationship with its Neighbours 2.1 A glance at any map of Iran shows its large number of neighbours. Counting those with whom it shares a water boundary the number is 11. Some are comparatively new states, such as Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Others are unstable, like Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Since the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iran’s influence in that country has grown steadily. The Arab states of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman are all predominantly Sunni and view their large (non-Arab and Shiite) neighbour with some suspicion. 2.2 Having survived the war from 1980–88, instigated by Iraq, Iran has benefited hugely from the US war with that country; Iraq has been significantly weakened and therefore is unlikely to threaten Iran further, or prove a rival in any contest for power within the region; access to Shia religious sites is now possible, and Iran’s influence over the current Iraqi government (and militia groups) is highly significant. Should the US launch any attack on Iran, the consequences for the occupying forces in Iraq would be devastating as Shia militias, backed by Iran, would increase their attacks dramatically. 2.3 In the wider context of the Middle East, Iran enjoys good relations with Syria, which was the only country which supported them in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. In Lebanon, Iran was influential in the creation of Hizbollah (The Party of God) and still supplies them with money, arms and political advice. These close ties give rise to Israel’s concern that, should the US attack Iran, Hizbollah would immediately attack Israel. Israel has also accused Iran of having close ties with Hamas, but while there is evidence of financial support, it is believed that Iran’s influence there is not very significant. 3. Iran’s Political Structure 3.1 The Iranian form of government is often described as a theocracy, but in many respects it is more complex and its characteristics mark it out as relatively unusual. The executive, parliament and judiciary are overseen by several bodies dominated by the clergy and at the head of both the state and the oversight institutions is the supreme leader, whose duties and authority are broadly equated with a head of state. 3.2 According to the former New York Times correspondent Steven Kinzer, “Iran is ruled by what effectively amounts to two governments. One is a functioning democracy, complete with elections, a feisty press, and a cadre of reformist politicians. The other is a narrow-minded clique of conservatives, comprised largely of mullahs, that has in many ways lost touch with the masses…”2 3.3 The political system is bound up with Shia religious philosophy. Ithna-Ashara or ‘Twelver’ Shi’ism is the dominant doctrine in Iran. Its name derives from adherents’ belief in twelve Imams, who were leaders of the faithful and direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. The twelfth Imam, Mohammed al-Mahdi, disappeared in infancy. Sometimes referred to as ‘the hidden Imam’, he is said to be in occultation until the end of the world. In the meantime adherents to the Twelver Shi’a doctrine are technically without a present leader. The religious authorities have immense power in the governing of Iran, and take very seriously the responsibility of safeguarding the Islamic Revolution. Their pronouncements are law and have to be (and generally are) adhered to. However the Shia tradition encourages debate and discussion amongst its adherents about such pronouncements and interpretations of the Shia theology. 3.4 The fact that the political structure is made up of competing institutions – parliament, the presidency, the judiciary, the Expediency Council, the Guardian Council and the Supreme Leader’s office - inevitably leads to political tensions and the potential for the system to break down. Political conflict generally centres on disputes between reformists and conservatives. However, a more accurate description of the present situation would be to suggest that conflict is taking place within the powerful conservative faction itself. After a period of reform, power is presently seen to be in the hands of the ultraconservatives. The ‘new guard’ represents the rise of the military in Iranian politics, with President Ahmadinejad having strong connections to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). However, the ‘old guard’ still dominates the key institutions within the political system. The make up of the Iranian political structure and their influence on each other is detailed in the guide below: 3.5 Unelected Institutions 3.5.1 Supreme Leader Initially, the Supreme Leader was intended to be a remote figure, intervening to resolve questions of government and national leadership only when other means failed. As the early years of the Islamic Republic devolved into internal factionalism between moderate and conservative factions, the supreme leader gradually came to control directly or indirectly almost every aspect of government. The supreme leader appoints the head of the judiciary, six of the members of the powerful Guardian Council, the commanders of all the armed forces, Friday prayer leaders, and the head of radio and television. He also confirms the election of the president. The supreme leader is chosen by the clerics who make up the Assembly of Experts, who are elected by the people. Tensions between the office of the supreme leader and the office of the President have often been a source of political instability. The current supreme leader is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 3.5.2 Armed Forces The armed forces are made up of the Revolutionary Guards and the regular forces. The Revolutionary Guard was formed after the revolution to protect the new leaders and institutions and to fight those opposing the revolution; today it has a powerful presence in other institutions and controls volunteer militias with branches in every town. It is the country’s most effective military force and consists of the most politically dependable and religiously devout personnel. All leading army and Revolutionary Guard commanders are appointed by the Supreme Leader and are answerable only to him. 3.5.3 Judicial System The judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, a Supreme Judicial Council and lower courts. The Iranian judiciary has never been wholly independent of political influence. It ensures that the Islamic laws are enforced and defines legal policy. It also nominates the six lay members of the Guardian Council. The chief justice and the prosecutor general must be specialists in Shiite canon law who have attained the status of Mujitahid.3 Under the 1979 constitution all judges must base their decisions on Shariah law. Violent corporal punishments are now the required form of punishment for a wide range of crimes, in the belief that this will act as a deterrent to others. Capital punishment, including public execution, is also prescribed for murder, rape, drug trafficking, armed robbery, apostasy and homosexuality. 3.5.4 Expediency Council The council is an advisory body for the Supreme Leader with ultimate adjudicative power in disputes over legislation between the parliament and the Guardian Council. The Supreme Leader appoints its members, who are prominent religious, social, and political figures. 3.6 Elected Bodies 3.6.1 President The President is elected for four years and can serve no more than two consecutive terms. While most nations in the Middle East have habitually elected leaders ‘for life’, Iran by contrast has adhered strictly to presidential term limits. The constitution describes the President as the second-highest ranking official in the country. He is head of the executive branch of power and is responsible for ensuring the constitution is implemented. The President is responsible for the day to day administration of government and the implementation of laws enacted by the legislature. Presidential powers are limited by the members of unelected bodies in Iran’s power structure, most of whom are clerics, and by the authority of the Supreme Leader. It is the Supreme Leader, not the president, who controls the armed forces and makes decisions on security, defense and major foreign policy issues. 3.6.2 Cabinet The Council of Ministers, as the Iranian presidential cabinet is called, are chosen by the president and approved by parliament, which can also impeach them. Ministers responsible for cultural and social issues are heavily monitored by conservatives watching for any sign of deviation from their strict Islamic line. The cabinet is chaired by the president or first vice-president, who is responsible for cabinet affairs. 3.6.3 Parliament. The 296 members of the Majles, or parliament, are elected by popular vote every four years. The parliament has the power to introduce and pass laws, as well as to summon and impeach ministers or the president, with a two thirds majority vote. However, all Majles bills have to be approved by the conservative Guardian Council. Suffrage is universal and the minimum voting age is 16. All important matters are subject to referenda. Most political parties have been banned and while the people may have the right to vote, candidates are ultimately elected by the Guardian Council who have veto powers over who can stand. 3.6.4 Assembly of Experts The responsibilities of the Assembly of Experts are to appoint the supreme leader, monitor his performance and remove him if he is deemed incapable of fulfilling his duties. The Assembly usually holds two sessions a year. Only clerics can join the Assembly and candidates for election (by public vote) are vetted by the Guardian Council. The Assembly is dominated by conservatives. 3.7 Jointly Appointed Body: Guardian Council The Guardian Council is the most influential political body in Iran. It is controlled by conservatives and consists of six theologians appointed by the supreme leader and six jurists nominated by the judiciary and approved by parliament, thus creating a deep conservative bias under the present governmental structures. Members are elected for six years on a phased basis, so that half the membership changes every three years. The Guardian Council has virtual veto power over every electoral candidate, and every piece of legislation that passes parliament to make sure they conform to the constitution and Islamic law. It is this feature of government more than any other that has caused frustration throughout Iran. Reformists have tried to restrict the council’s veto power without success. 3.8 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad President Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005, and is a complete contrast to his immediate predecessor, President Khatami. Where Khatami had been a moderate and reformist, popular with the people (although his reforms were opposed by conservative clerics), and successful in building up good relations with neighbouring countries, Ahmadinejad is an ultraconservative. He is populist and ideological, committed to restoring the true Islamic Revolution. He claims to be close to the ‘hidden Imam’, to whose imminent return he often refers, which makes his world view frighteningly apocalyptic. He is provocative and outspoken; he held a Holocaust Denial Conference, and has been widely quoted as calling for ‘Israel to be wiped off the map’. (The New Internationalist points out that what he actually said was ‘the regime occupying Jerusalem should vanish from the pages of time.’4) He has a sense of divine providence which sees the US and Israel as ungodly and unjust states that will inevitably collapse. However, as we have seen, the political system in Iran does not give complete power to the Presidency, and there is evidence that there are many within the country, including those in the corridors of power and positions of influence, who are very concerned about his rhetoric and his conduct. Signs at the beginning of 2008 were that the supreme leader was beginning to lose patience with President Ahmadinejad, publicly contradicting him, having once being one of his staunchest defenders. His re-election should not be taken for granted. 3.9 Ali_Akbar_Hashemi_Rafsanjani Hashemi_Rafsanjani is one of the most powerful people in Iran. He was Ayatollah Khomeini’s right-hand man in the 1980s and was the Speaker of the Majles from 1980 – 1989 and President of Iran from 1989 -1997. Currently he is Chairman of the Expediency Council, a post he has held since 1989 and he has also been Chairman of the Assembly of Experts since 2007. 4. The Economy of Iran 4.1 Iran’s economy is somewhat of a paradox; it was 15th in the world in terms of the GDP (PPP) ranking by the World Bank in 2005. (This is the Gross Domestic Product adjusted to take account of Purchasing Power Parity – which essentially takes into account relative cost of living and inflation rates). It has vast reserves of oil, (an estimated 137 billion barrels of oil making it second only to Saudi Arabia) as well as 971 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The Iranian economy is hugely dependant on its oil exports; that industry and most other industries are almost exclusively government owned and controlled, as are most public utilities and services. 4.2 Since the Revolution, Iran has consistently struggled to make the most of its resources. It currently produces just 3.9 million barrels of oil a day – failing to meet the quota allocated to it by OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries). There is a huge amount of corruption and inefficiency in the system, which has meant that, despite the great natural wealth of the country, the economy has hardly grown since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. (The war with Iraq in the 1980s and UN and US sanctions have not helped, but the parlous state of the economy cannot be solely blamed on them.) Lack of efficient systems and any transparency means millions of Iranians avoid paying any tax, thus depriving the government of what could be a valuable source of income; much of government money which could otherwise have been spent on investment is used instead to shore up state-run industries. The state also gives massive subsidies, particularly in energy. Over $7 billion worth of petrol is imported each year, yet Iranians pay only 35 cents a gallon, thanks to public subsidy. There is no incentive for industries to save on energy consumption. Red tape, nepotism and inefficient structures are other factors militating against a growing economy. Iran is also a net importer of natural gas, having failed to develop the vast offshore gas field it shares with Qatar. 4.3 President Ahmadinejad won his landslide victory in 2005 by promising a fairer distribution of wealth to the poor. These promises have proved undeliverable in the face of corruption and mismanagement, and his attempt to cut petrol subsidies resulted in widespread popular unrest. His spending has outrun his budget and he has been criticised from all sides for causing inflation to rise to around 17%, while unemployment, (officially stated to be 11%) is believed by most economic experts to be well over 20%, and rising. 4.4 Under Islamic law, prosperous individuals or companies should give a fitting proportion of their wealth to charities. Frequently this leads to funding through the mosques, and there are substantial revenues used by them in charitable ways. But these are not the only charities in Iran. The Bonyads (charity foundations) are estimated to control over 30% of the economy and yet pay no taxes at all. They are involved in everything from vast Soybean and cotton fields to hotels to soft drinks to auto-manufacturing to shipping lines. These foundations represent vast economic empires that are neither taxed nor are directly under government control. 5. Human Rights 5.1 Since 2005, there has been a dramatic increase in the use of the death penalty, from 94 in 2005, to 200 in 2006, and 300 in 2007. (These figures include a number of juveniles.) A further 38 executions had taken place by the end of January 2008. In that same month, Iran’s Judiciary Chief decreed that executions must be held behind closed doors, in effect curbing the increasing number of public executions; however, this will not mean any fewer deaths. Currently, Iran is second only to China in the numbers of executions it carries out. 5.2 Human rights abuses have also escalated since 2005. Robert Tait, the Guardian journalist who was expelled in January 2008, wrote ‘under Ahmadinejad, the flame of relative glasnost ignited by ….Khatami has been extinguished. Liberal minded newspapers critical of the government have been closed and journalists jailed for misdemeanours ranging from printing ‘lies’ to insulting Islamic mores.’ Tait’s expulsion means there is now no British journalist of an English speaking newspaper in Iran; many other western journalists have either left or been expelled. As for Iranians themselves, Human Rights Watch has highlighted how the government is using ‘national security’ as a pretext for clamping down on any criticism of their policies, and any comment of dissent, even though peacefully expressed. There has been a marked increase in the number of arrests of student activists, campaigners for women’s rights, labour leaders, journalists and scholars, people who have been involved in peaceful political expression. There is also evidence that detainees have been subjected to inhumane treatment, including intimidation and torture, often in the notorious Section 209 in Evin Prison. This is in clear violation of both domestic laws and International Human Rights treaties to which Iran is a signatory. The fact that the US government actively promotes the allocation of funds for ‘regime change’ creates even more danger for activists within Iran, who are now charged with being the agents of foreign enemies. Human Rights Watch has called for such funds to be better targeted in developing technological systems which will allow Iranians to communicate their dissent on the Internet, and in facilitating more social and cultural communication with the global community. 5.3 Christians in Iran 5.3.1 Christians represent between 0.1 and 0.6% of the total population of Iran, with the largest church being the Armenian Apostolic Church; there are small numbers of Roman Catholic, Anglican and Protestant Christians. Iranian Christians tend to be urban, with approximately 50% living in Tehran; some are relatively well off economically. While Christians are allowed to participate in Iran’s economic and social life, many have encountered officially sanctioned discrimination in the areas of employment, education, public accommodation, the legal system and property ownership. Since 1979, all Iranian students must be instructed in Islam, regardless of their religion . Tests in Islamic theology are required for all university applications and for university positions and public sector jobs. It is often difficult for a Christian to obtain a passport and the publication of Christian texts, while legal, rarely receives the necessary government approval. Christians in Iran have also encountered various forms of harassment by the Iranian government including torture, long-term imprisonment (with and without trial), unfair trails and execution. Under Islam’s strict apostasy laws, any Muslim who leaves Islam faces the death penalty; there have been documented cases where Muslims who have converted to Christianity have been arrested, and held in custody for a number of weeks before being released. In most cases they were forced to pay large bail amounts and were told their cases remain open for possible criminal prosecution. 5.3.2 As with many of the countries in the Middle East, the current conflict there puts many local Christians in a very difficult position; they are often identified as supporting the Western (and Christian) countries. For this reason, the number of Iranian Christians is decreasing, with a sizeable number (10-20,000) emigrating each year. 6. Relations with the West 6.1 It is difficult to underestimate the level of mistrust which exists between Iran and the west, specifically the US and UK. The pivotal role played in 1953 by the west in overthrowing Mosaddeq (and installing the Shah in his place) has never been forgotten. In 1979/80 US pride was deeply hurt by the American Embassy Hostage crisis. During the Iran-Iraq war, the US backed and armed Saddam Hussein in this 8 year war; despite this, Iran did not lose the war. Also during this time, the Iran-Contra affair proved a major embarrassment to the US government. 6.2 Despite this mutual dislike and lack of trust, there were some signs in the 1990s of a rapprochement between the reformist Iranian President Khatami and US President Clinton. When America was attacked in 2001, Iran publicly expressed solidarity with the victims, and is known to have co-operated covertly in the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the subsequent negotiations about that country’s future. But hardliners on both sides viewed with real concern such signs of rapprochement and improvement in US-Iran relations; they were determined to ensure that old enmities remained. This determination and the discovery of a shipment of Iranian arms bound for the Palestinian Authority, led to President Bush declaring in January 2002 that Iran was part of an ‘Axis of Evil’, along with Iraq and North Korea. Relations between the two countries have deteriorated even further, particularly since the election of President Ahmadinejad, with his polemics against Israel, the US and the West. 7. Iran and Nuclear Weapons It is against this background that we turn to the issue which has been dominant in international affairs, the question of whether Iran has been developing a nuclear weapon. It is extremely difficult to ascertain the extent of Iran’s nuclear capability, its motivation for engaging in such a development and the extent to which the US may be using the issue as a possible excuse to attack Iran. 7.1 Background 7.1.1 Iran has had a nuclear programme for almost 50 years, beginning with a research reactor purchased from the US in 1959. The Shah's plan to build 23 nuclear power reactors by the 1990s was regarded as grandiose, but not necessarily viewed as a ‘back door’ to a nuclear weapons programme, possibly because Iran did not then seek the technologies to enrich or reprocess its own fuel. There were a few suspicions of a nuclear weapons programme, but these abated in the decade between the Iranian 1979 revolution and the end of Iran-Iraq war, both of which brought a halt to nuclear activities. After the war, the nuclear power programme resumed and Iran argues that nuclear power is necessary for rising domestic energy consumption, while oil and gas are needed to generate foreign currency. This is viewed with scepticism by western powers. 7.1.2 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has declared that Iran has 3,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges now operative. These would theoretically be enough to produce sufficient enriched uranium for a crude bomb in perhaps a year if all the other technical difficulties could be overcome and if the centrifuges could work efficiently. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is doubtful on both counts. Ahmadinejad is speaking to a national audience and is almost certainly exaggerating, but he faces continuing economic problems and such claims are useful diversions. The head of the IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei, said on 24th May 2007 that Iran could take between 3 and 8 years to make a bomb. 7.2 The Non Proliferation Treaty 7.2.1 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is an international treaty to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. It opened for signature on July 1st 1968. Iran is one of the 189 states currently party to the treaty, five of which have nuclear weapons: the US, the UK, France, Russia, and China. Only four nations are not signatories: India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. 7.2.2 Article VI of the NPT commits member states to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament’. It also gives all signatories the ‘inalienable right… to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes’. When the NPT came into force in 1970, the central bargain was between the five nuclear-weapon powers on one hand, and the non-nuclear states on the other. The have-nots agreed to renounce their right to weapons, but only in return for the right to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Iran is therefore within its rights under the NPT to pursue nuclear energy, but this has been seen as a loophole through which Iran could develop nuclear weapons. 7.2.3 On 18th December 2003, Ambassador Salehi of Iran and the Director General of the IAEA signed an Additional Protocol to Iran's NPT safeguards agreement. The Additional Protocol requires States to provide an expanded declaration of their nuclear activities and grants the Agency broader rights of access to sites in the country. Iran has not yet ratified the protocol, but has stated that it is acting in accordance with its provisions. 7.2.4 Those states who have nuclear weapons claim they have complied with Article IV5 of the NPT by reducing their warheads, but it is clear that when for example, the UK Government commits itself to renew the Trident Missile System that it is not moving towards nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty. The US is also active in developing new forms of nuclear weapons which is contrary to the principles of the NPT. When the western powers make demands on Iran, there is a need to understand why there will be resentment and anger within the Iranian government at what they see as gross hypocrisy and double standards on the part of these nations. 7.3 Why the Bomb? 7.3.1 Why would Iran wish to have a nuclear weapon in the first place? The first reason is that Iran has become increasingly powerful and influential in the region, particularly because of the Iraq war which has greatly benefited Iran. Iran sees itself as a major player in the Middle East and as such, there is no reason why it should not possess what some see as the ultimate symbol of a strong power, that of a nuclear weapon. 7.3.2 Secondly, Iran would wish to have the bomb to balance the situation with Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons and create a Mutually Assured Destruction principle in the Middle East, similar to that of Pakistan and India. 7.3.3 Thirdly, although Iran’s borders have only been violated once, during the Iran-Iraq war, there is the belief that a nuclear weapon would act as a deterrent against any power which may seek to invade Iran. 7.3.4 Finally, there is the wider geopolitical environment in which Iran finds itself, not only in relation to Israel, but also because of the proximity of Pakistan and the American military presence in the region. The issue of Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons has to be taken into account when seeking to understand Iran’s position. Israel has sought never to officially comment on whether or not it has nuclear weapons. Despite this, western intelligence agencies all believe that it possess such weapons. The perspective from Iran’s point of view is that it exists in a region in which Israel possesses a nuclear capability and it looks upon western powers that have themselves violated the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. 7.3.5 The US, by continuing to supply Israel with substantial aid, is in breach of its own laws regarding supplying aid to states with unauthorised weapons of mass destruction. The same argument could be applied to Pakistan, which has also failed to sign the NPT, but has received substantial aid for many years from the US. Its laws prohibit the President from providing military aid to any country ‘which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights’. Under the 1967 US Arms Export Control Act, it is illegal to use US weapons to carry out extra-judicial killings. This act stipulates that weapons be sold to ‘friendly countries solely for internal security and legitimate defense’. This makes the US position on Iran appear highly hypocritical, and not just from the Iranian perspective; during President Bush’s visit to various countries in the Middle East in January 2008, it was reported that “Iran’s nuclear ambitions were invariably coupled with furious denunciations of Israel’s all too real WMD arsenal and western ‘double standards’ in tolerating it. 6 7.4 The View of Iran’s Neighbours 7.4.1 The other states in the region have mixed opinions about a nuclear-capable Iran. Some leaders fear a nuclear Iran might disrupt the balance of power in the Middle East, embolden the minority Shiite populations present throughout the region, or, worse, set off a regional nuclear-arms race. For example, Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia, speaking at a conference in London on January 16, 2006, stated: “We are urging Iran to accept the position that we have taken to make the Gulf, as part of the Middle East, nuclear free and free of weapons of mass destruction. We hope that they will join us in this policy and assure that no new threat of arms race happens in this region.” 7 However, others sympathize with Iran’s defiance of the US, and see its democracy-building policies in the region, as well as its support for Israel and a Shiite-led Iraq, as a greater threat to regional stability than a nuclear-capable Iran. They appreciate that there is little apparent danger that any such weapon would be deployed against them or other neighbours; some governments in the region tend to view Iran’s bomb as a ‘Muslim bomb’, balancing against it the fact that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, and that the US presence in the region continues unabated. 7.4.2 Israel is the obvious exception here and views Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons as the greatest threat to stability in the Middle East. The Vice Premier, Shimon Peres, stated that Iran was ‘single-handedly the world’s most serious security threat’.8 Israel has, from time to time, issued strong statements on the Iranian situation and has even threatened to take pre-emptive action should Iran require a nuclear bomb. 7.5 UN Sanctions 7.5.1 The Security Council has placed a series of sanctions on Iran for ignoring its demand that the uranium-enrichment programme be suspended. Resolution 1737 was passed in December 2006. It was written under Article 41 of the UN Charter which allows for economic measures, but not the use of military force. It mandates all UN member states ‘to prevent the supply, sale or transfer ... of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems’. In March 2007, the Council passed resolution 1747, also under Article 41. This seeks to tighten the squeeze on Iran's nuclear and missile programmes by preventing dealings with the state Bank Sepah and 28 named people and organisations, many connected to the elite Revolutionary Guard. 7.5.2 In a speech to the UN General Assembly on 25th September 2007, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran would ignore the Security Council’s ‘political’ resolutions and would regard the issue as a ‘technical’ issue to be discussed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEU). 7.5.3 The US and its closest allies on this issue – Britain, France and Germany – are pressing for further measures in the Security Council against more individuals and organisations in an attempt to bring further pressure on Iran. So far, Russia and China have not agreed. President Putin has stated that there is no evidence that Iran is building a nuclear weapon. 7.5.4 It is hoped that such sanctions may encourage Iran to abandon any plans to develop nuclear weapons by hitting Iran’s economy. However, it unlikely that sanctions will have a strong enough impact to influence Iran, especially as they are unlikely to be supported by Russia and China, combined with the fact that Iran possesses substantial reserves of oil. 7.6 Iran and the E3-EU 7.6.1 The negotiations between the E3/EU (France, Germany and UK) and Iran began in December 2004, following conclusion of the Paris Agreement on 15th November 2004. The Paris Agreement says: “In the context of this suspension (by Iran of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, including specifically all tests or production at any uranium conversion installation), the E3/EU and Iran have agreed to begin negotiations, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on long term arrangements. The agreement will provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes. It will equally provide firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues.” 7.6.2 In October 2004, prior to the Paris Agreement, the E3/EU presented ideas to Iran on the possible shape of such a long-term agreement. Iran produced proposals in March 2005, but these were based on Iran's early resumption of fissile material production, without a comprehensible explanation of the civilian use for the nuclear material that would be produced. 7.6.3 On 25 May 2005, E3 Foreign Ministers and Javier Solana met an Iranian delegation led by Dr Hassan Rouhani in Geneva. They agreed that the E3/EU would present comprehensive proposals for long-term arrangements, at the end of July or at the beginning of August. On 5 August, the E3/EU accordingly passed to Iran a ‘Framework for a Long-term Agreement’. On 13th March 2006, the E3/EU parties met in Berlin following the resumption of uranium enrichment activity. Part of the statement issued stated: ‘Iran's decision to restart enrichment activity is a clear rejection of the process the E3/EU and Iran have been engaged in for over two years with the support of the international community. In addition it constitutes a further challenge to the authority of the IAEA and international community. We have, therefore, decided to inform the IAEA Board of Governors that our discussions with Iran have reached an impasse.’ 7.6.4 The statement went on to explain that the Europeans had negotiated in good faith and said that Iran had been presented with the most far reaching proposals for co-operation with Europe in the political, security and economic fields since the Revolution. These reaffirmed Iran's rights under the NPT and included European support for a strictly civilian nuclear programme in Iran, as well as proposals that would have given Iran internationally guaranteed supplies of fuel for its nuclear power programme. The statement alleged that the Iranian government was intent on turning its back on better relations with the international community. 7.6.5 At the present time, this remains the position of the EU in regard to Iran. Factors which have inhibited European diplomatic efforts are the lack of sufficient economic/political carrots and sticks in European hands and the hardening of domestic politics in Iran. 7.7 Russia and China 7.7.1 The cornerstone of Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Iran is at Bushehr – a power plant construction programme where the presence of approximately 1,000 Russian and Ukrainian engineers and technicians is a cause for grave concern to the international community. The ‘human factor’ – the transfer of technical know-how from Russian scientists to a new generation of Iranian nuclear experts is seen as an especially significant security threat. The Russian government has always justified its advanced technical cooperation with Iran on the grounds that it believes Iran’s nuclear ambitions are civilian-oriented only. Russia has genuine proliferation concerns and no interest in Iran possessing a nuclear bomb – even with current missile delivery platforms, Iran could reach targets in southern Russia if it chose to do so. 7.7.2 China and Iran have had cordial relations for many years, but China is keen to prevent nuclear proliferation, which it does not view as conducive to its security. The development of nuclear weapons by Iran would negatively affect non-proliferation efforts elsewhere in the world, including in China’s vicinity. China relies on the Middle East for roughly half of its oil imports; hence stability in the region is as much a concern for China as it is for other countries. 7.8 US Intelligence Assessment 7.8.1 A surprise development in December 2007 was an assessment by US Intelligence agencies that Iran had ceased work on producing a nuclear weapon in 2003. National Intelligence Estimates are the consensus judgments of the nation's 16 intelligence agencies on key concerns. Between 15 and 20 are produced every year, and they go through multiple steps to check the validity of information and analysis. 7.8.2 The report stated, with high confidence, that the US intelligence community believed that Iran halted its nuclear weapons programme in the autumn of 2003. It went on to state with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. 7.8.3 In the US, some republicans have contrasted the Iran National Intelligence Estimate with the flawed 2002 assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programme. They have suggested that the intelligence community were wrong then and therefore may also be wrong over their assessment of Iran’s nuclear capability. 7.8.4 While many commentators believed at the time of this assessment that it substantially reduced the risk of a US military air strike on Iran, there is the need for caution in this regard. The Bush administration could simply ignore the findings on the grounds that they may be wrong or on the basis that Iran still has the potential to resume work on producing a nuclear weapon at some point in the future. 7.9 Conclusion The Church of Scotland General Assembly has consistently opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons and has called for nuclear disarmament. We do not believe that it is in the interests of the region for Iran, or any other state in the area, to develop a nuclear weapons capability. However, the position of the UK and US governments in particular is gravely weakened in relation to Iran when the UK seeks to renew Trident. We would argue that this failure to address their own plans for nuclear weapons expansion means that the UK and US governments are in a weak position to deal with Iran and that negotiations to address the Iranian nuclear weapons issue should continue to be led by the UN and the IAEA. 8. Possible United States Military Action 8.1 Five years after his State of the Union address in which he branded Iran as part of the ‘axis of evil’, President Bush continued to attack Iran in his final address to Congress in January 2008. He reiterated his rhetoric on Iran, accusing the country of supporting terrorists and demanding that it ‘come clean’ on its nuclear programme. Such comments mean that there still remains a possibility, despite the US intelligence report on its nuclear programme, of a military strike against Iran by the US. 8.2 We believe strongly that a US military strike on key Iranian targets would have devastating consequences for the region and for world peace. It would be highly counter productive and lead to instability in the Middle East which would take many years to settle. For example, the risk of Iranian retaliation against Israel is a possibility and such a move could also further destabilise Iraq as Iranian backed insurgents in the country seek retaliation against the US. Such an attack would also break international law since it is extremely unlikely that it would have been sanctioned by the United Nations. We would further strongly urge the UK government to do everything in its power to discourage the US government from undertaking any form of military strike against Iran and, should it ignore such advice, make clear its strong opposition to such a move. 9. Summary 9.1 It is all too easy to see the Iranian situation from a Western perspective and to fall into the simplistic view that Iran is an evil country, with dangerous ambitions, set against western governments and their quest to advance democracy in the region. The situation is much more complex. The continuing argument over whether or not Iran is seeking to build a nuclear weapon means that many in the West fail to see beyond the stereotypical impression of Iran to the many different aspects about this country. There is the ordinary Iranian blogging online, the people’s love of dance and music shaped by its history, the intensity of political debates among ordinary people on the street, the 300 international awards to Iranian cinema over the past 25 years, the beautiful traditional teahouses and the Persian Gardens which were designed to reflect paradise on earth. A recent BBC documentary about Iranian women who race cars (…the 31-year-old sportswoman, nicknamed ‘Little Schumacher’ is a minor celebrity in her native country) is one of the ways in which Western assumptions about this complex country can be reshaped. 9.2 Iran is a proud nation with a long and varied history. It holds an important and strategic position in the Middle East, having benefited from the US led war against Iraq, it now has significant influence with the current governments of both Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a country with a complex system of government, but one where the unelected religious establishment has tight control of the elected parliament and president. Religious rule is vigorously enforced on a society which does not always agree with it. Iranians have enjoyed a long tradition of vigorous debate, with the right to free speech highly valued. Regrettably, the last three years has seen more determined and ruthless repression of public dissent, with anyone voicing criticism of the regime being arrested and detained on the grounds of ‘national security’. International concern continues to be expressed at Iran’s deteriorating record on human rights. 9.3 The whole issue of whether or not Iran has been pursuing a programme to develop nuclear weapons, under the guise of peaceful nuclear energy developments, has engaged the international community for years. The world has watched uneasily as the threat of US military action against Iran has seemed ever more likely. The tension was deferred somewhat by the publication of the US military intelligence report in December 2007, suggesting that Iran had indeed stopped actively pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. Nevertheless, there remains significant concern about Iran’s transparency and co-operation with the IAEA, the UN and the EU/E3. 9.4 Two possible scenarios continue to cause apprehension. The first is that President Bush may still be looking for an excuse to attack Iran; the nuclear weapons issue having been ‘diffused’, he has increasingly turned to blaming Iran for the destabilisation of Iraq. The second is that President Ahmadinejad, aware of his increasing unpopularity with his domestic policies, may deliberately try to provoke the US into attacking Iran, thus uniting the country behind him. President Bush will have found little support for any such attack from either his own military strategists or other Western allies, equally President Ahmadinejad does not have total power, and there is growing evidence that he is losing the support of the supreme leader and other influential bodies in Iran. 9.5 While we deplore the Iranian authorities escalating human rights abuses, we cannot and must not demonise an entire nation. Iran is a mature state which has a part to play in the whole Middle East question, and this must be recognised. It is time that western governments ceased to engage in rhetoric and actively engaged with Iran in a constructive manner. Equally, it is time that Iran ceased to play games with the West and explained precisely what its ambitions are in regard to nuclear energy. 9.6 The lesson of the tragic events in Iraq since that nation was illegally invaded five years ago is that the use of military intervention to resolve a crisis rarely results in a positive outcome and usually makes a situation worse. The same is true of Iraq’s neighbour. It is our hope and prayer that such a terrible mistake will not be repeated. 9.7 Iran’s future may lie not with negotiators in the West, or even its leadership, but with its people. Young Iranians make up an estimated 70% of their country’s population and many are frustrated with the way that the government is running their nation and are longing for change. Could it be that this young population in this ancient land may peacefully and constructively bring about the changes that Iran so desperately needs? 1 Iran, its neighbours and the regional crises – A Middle East Programme Report from Chatham House 2 Introduction to Iran: The Essential Guide to a Country on the Brink by Stephen Kinzer 3 A Moslem cleric rises through five grades of rank in his career. He starts out as a talib ilm--a student. He moves on to mujitahid--a person capable of arriving at an opinion. Then a mubelleg al-risala--"a carrier of the message;" a hojat al-Islam--an "authority on Islam;" and ayatollah--a "sign of God." The final, and ultimate level of authority is ayatollah al-uzma-- "great sign of god." (Mohammed Heikal, The Return of the Ayatollah, p. 83.) 4 New Internationalist, March 2007, No. 398 5 NPT Article IV: 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty. 2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. 6 Ian Black, The Guardian; 16th January 2008. 7 The Times, January 17th 2006 8 Interview with Israel Radio, January 24th 2005